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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON S . CHEEVER, MARTHA 
T. CHEEVER, UTAH COUNTY 
PACKING COMPANY, I N C . , and 
COLES BROTHERS, I N C . , 
P l a i n t i f f s - A p p e l l a n t s , 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, MYRA 
K. SEETHALER, and SECURITY 
TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY, 
D e f e n d a n t s - R e s p o n d e n t s . 
No. 20,362 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
In responding to BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS Appellants will follow 
the format of the Respondent's Brief. All references will be to 
the numbered pages of the Respondent's Brief unless otherwise 
stated. 
STATEMENT'OF FACTS/NATURE OF CASE 
On page 3, paragraph 1, it is a misstatement of fact that 
"as president of Utah County Packing, Vernon Cheever achieved a 
compromise with Seethaler in the price of the accounts receivable 
to off-set the equipment failures". The true fact is that they 
were having ongoing negotiations but there never was a "compromise" 
(see Affidavit of VERNON CHEEVER, Exhibit 9 and Affidavit of BRUCE 
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COLES, Exhibit 11, of Appellant Brief.) 
Beginning the last paragraph of page 3 the Respondents claim 
that the Appellants action is an "...action seeking an injunction...". 
That is not the case, Appellants THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT, (a copy 
of which is incorporated in this Brief as Exhibit 7, was inadvert-
antly omitted from Appellants Brief) has several causes of action. 
The FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION is to have the Note and Deed of Trust 
reformed to be only in the amount of $25,000.00 and not $371,750.00. 
The SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION seeks a complete recession of the doc-
uments by reason of fraud. 
On the last five lines of page 8 of Respondent's Brief they 
allege that the "Court ruled that the principal, Utah County Packing, 
after discovering all the facts upon which it now complained, had 
ratified or affirmed the contract between the buyer and the seller." 
Respondent does not say where in the record that occurs but even 
if it does occur it is not possible because the Court is ruling on 
a "question of fact" which is not proper on Summary Judgment. Further, 
the Affidavit of VERNON CHEEVER, Exhibit 9 of Appellant's Brief 
and of BRUCE COLES, Exhibit 11 of Appellant's Brief, are to the con-
trary. Those Affidavits clearly show that a question of fact still 
existed. 
In the middle of page 9 of Respondent's Brief, the Respondent 
states as follows: 
The Court further found that the Plaintiffs Complaint 
did not state a cause of action for fraud and that 
the Defendant had admitted that any claim by Utah 
County Packing is barred by the statute of limitations. 
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REPLY TO RESPONDENTS1 POINTS 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS1 BRIEF DOES NOT MEET THE STANDARDS 
SET FORTH BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND APPELLANTS1 
CASE, AS STATED, CANNOT PREVAIL UPON APPEAL. 
Respondent's POINT I, is not well taken, Appellant's Brief 
shows that Appellant argued all of the Respondent's Points in its' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (See Exhibit 4 of Appellants Brief). 
The arguments on the four points are contained in Appellant's 
Brief at page 9 et al. Other arguments are also incorporated. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT UTAH 
COUNTY PACKING AND COLES BROTHERS, INC. WERE 
NECESSARY AND INDISPENSIBLE PARTIES. 
Under POINT II, Respondents, on page 16, state as follows: 
One of the basis for that Ruling was that the cause 
of action for fraud, if any, belonged to the cor-
poration, and not to the individual plaintiffs. 
Before analyzing other incorrect positions of the Respondent, 
it should be made very clear that UTAH COUNTY PACKING/ had a cause 
of action for fraud on its "contract" for the purchase of the meat 
packing business. That cause of action is a seperate and distinct 
cause of action apart from the cause of action that the CHEEVERS 
had. Their cause of action are set forth in the FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION, and SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION of the THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Exhibit 7, filed herein and inadvertantly omitted from Appellant's 
Brief.). The cause of action of CHEEVERS has nothing to do with 
the purchase of the business. Their cause of action is to have de-
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clared of no force and effect the TRUST DEED NOTE, and DEED OF TRUST 
Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 of Appellant's Brief at page 28 and 29 there-
in. The Trust Deed is on their residence. 
Next is the statement by the Respondents on page 17 of their 
Brief 
Utah County Packing Company has, therefore, elected to 
affirm the Contract and has waived any claim for damages. 
Appellant asserts that it wouldn't matter whether or not Utah 
County Packing Company elected to affirm their contract or not. 
That contract has nothing to do with the Appellants causes of action 
to have the TRUST DEED NOTE and DEED OF TRUST, declared of no force 
and effect. Utah County Packing never signed the Deed of Trust. 
Also in the middle of page 17 of their Brief they state that 
there was an "accord and satisfaction". That is not true. That 
would require a finding of fact on the part of the trial court which 
would not be possible upon Stimmary Judgment. (See Exhibit 9 and 11 
of Appellant's Brief.) 
In the next to the last paragraph of page 17 of Respondent's 
Brief they allege: 
Where the existing plaintiff has failed to join other 
necessary plaintiffs, the entire case must be dismissed. 
Appellant does not see the rational of this argument. The 
record is crystal clear that they were properly joined. (See THIRD 
AMENDED COMPLAINT, Exhibit 7 herein, showing their having been joined, 
R. 516-549; for the authority of having them joined see 
E x h i b i t s 1 3 , 1 4 , and 15 of APPELLANT'S BRIEF.) 
Finally in disposing of Respondent's POINT II, the Appellants 
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asks, So what? The Record is clear that they were joined. 
POINT III 
AS CONCEDED BY APPELLANTS, ANY ACTION BY UTAH 
COUNTY PACKING AND COLES BROTHERS, INC. WAS BARRED 
BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Respondent's arguments herein are also MOOT. They were joined 
and its conceded that apparently that they were barred by the 
applicable Statute of Limitations. The effect of them being barred, 
satisfied the very need for joining "indispensable parties". That 
reason is to have a final determination as to all of the issues re-
garding those "indispensable parties"; the issues are finally re-
solved,' this is particularly true in the fact that no appeal has 
been taken on those corporate "indispensable parties" and they 
cannot be of any hazard to the Respondents. 
Throughout POINT III, there is also again the assertion that 
the claim of Utah County Packing Company had been "waived". 
Of course that is not true. (See Exhibit 9 and 11 of Appellant's 
Brief.) 
POINT IV 
CHEEVER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND GUARANTOR, HAD NO 
STANDING TO BRING AN ACTION FOR RESCISSION WHEN ANY 
ALLEGED DAMAGE WAS DONE TO UTAH COUNTY PACKING/COLES 
BROTHERS AND CHEEVER, AS PRESIDENT OF UTAH COUNTY 
PACKING ELECTED TO SEEK DAMAGES, AND THROUGH 
COMPROMISE TO AFFIRM AND RATIFY THE CONTRACT. 
Again, it is absolutly essential that it be understoood that 
the cause of action of the Appellants has nothing to do with the 
purchase of the Meat Pacing plant by Utah County Packing Company 
from the Defendants but has to do with the Plaintiffs rights as a 
guarantor. Their rights having nothing to do with the purchase of 
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the meat packing plant. Their rights are independent of any actions 
or rights of Utah County Packing. 
On the bottom of page 23 of the Respondents Brief they talk 
about the "principle obligation". The "principle obligation" in 
this case is the obligation between the defendants and Utah Count? 
Packing. The "principle obligation" has nothing to do with the 
"independent rights" of the Appellants, who are guarantors. At 
the top of page 24 Respondents state: "a guarantor may assert all 
defenses, with the exception of personal defenses available to the 
principle." A reading of that case indicates that the "principle 
defenses" are the defenses such as "infancy and incapacity". The 
Respondents are correct; the Guarantors, the Appellants, can 
raise any defenses that they have. 
In SUMITOMO BANK OF CALIFORNIA v IWASAKI 447 P2d 956, 959, the 
Court stated: 
In all suretyship relations, the creditor owes to the 
surety a duty of continuous good faith and fair deal-
ing. (County of Glenn v. Jones (1905) 146 Cal. 518, 
520, 80 P. 695; Ely v. Liscomb (1914) 24 Cal.App. 244, 
228, 140 P. 1086; Hamlen v. Rednalloh Co. (1935) 291 
Mass. 119, 197 N.E. 149, 153, 99 A.L.R. 1230; First 
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Utica v. Shermans Estate 
(1937) 250 App.Div. 339, 294 N.Y.S. 131, 139; Stearns, 
The Law of Suretyship (5th ed. 19 51) §2.11, at p. 
22; 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (14th ed. 1918) 
§ 448, at p. 430.) Thus, the cr€>ditor must not mis-
represent or conceal facts so as to induce or permit 
the surety to enter or continue in the relationship 
in reliance on a false impression as to the nature 
of the risk. As with other contracts, a creditor's 
fraud, which may consist of intentional or negli-
gent misrepresentation C- active suppression of 
the truth, will discharge the surety as to any sub-
sequently incurred liability. (Arant, Law of Surety-
ship and Guaranty (19 31 § 28, at p. 75; 1 Brandt, 
The Law of Suretyship and Guaranty (3rd ed. 19 05) 
§ 256, at p. 505; cf. 1 Corbin on Contracts (1963) 
§ 6, at pp. 12-13.)(page 959.) 
That rule imposes an absolute duty upon the obligee 
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to volunteer disclosure of all facts materially 
affecting the risk to the surety on a fidelity 
bond Irrespective of motive or intent, 
mere non-disclosure of facts known by the obligee 
which materially affect the surety's risk, such as 
prior dishonesty of the principal on the fidelity 
bond, therefore discharges the surety, (page 960) 
The same concept is set forth in SURETYSHIP, 74 AM JUR 2d, 
91: 
Hence the slightest fraud on the part of the creditor 
touching the contract, annuls it. Accourdingly, 
it has been said that if a creditor induces a surety 
to enter into the contract of suretyship by any 
fraudulent concealment of material facts, or by any 
express or implied misrepresentations of such facts 
or by taking any undue advantage of surety, either 
by surprise or by withholding proper information, 
there will be afforded a sufficient ground for the 
invalidation of the contract. 
It should also be noted that because of the special relation-
ship of Guarantor or Suretyship, that there be no necessity of any 
"positive affirmations". 
Fraud on the part of the obligee such as will avoid 
the contract of suretyship is not confined to pos-
itive affirmations which are untrue, but may consist 
in the concealment or withholding by him from the 
surety, at the time the contract of suretyship is 
executed, of material facts affecting the risk, 
which contract of suretyship is executed, of 
material facts affecting the risk, which facts the 
obligee has the opportunity, and which it is his 
duty, to disclose However, if, in the cir-
cumstances, the concealment is fraudulent, the 
motive of the obligee is immaterial. (74 Am Jur 2d 92) 
The ETTLINGER citation, bottom of page 24 of Respondent's 
Brief, is not in point. The "contract induced by fraud" referred 
to on the top of page 25 is referring, in this instance, to the 
"contract"for the purchase of the meat packing plant by Utah County 
Packing. We are not concerned with that contract? we are concerned 
with the contract of SURETYSHIP that is set forth in Exhibit 1 and 
2 of the Appellantfs Brief. That is the contract that was incurred 
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fraud/ those are the contracts that privy only to the Appellants. 
Those contracts. Exhibit 1 and 2 have nothing to do with Utah County 
Packing. 
On page 27 of Respondent's Brief, they claim that " any 
representations were made exclusively to the president of Utah 
Packing Company, and the plaintiffs, as guarantors, are without 
standing to assert the claims or defenses of Utah Packing Company." 
That is not true! The false representations were made to the Pres-
ident of Utah County Packing Company, but they were also made to the 
individual, Vernon Cheever. For the "seperate entity" doctrine, see 
page 20-23 of Appellant's Brief. Respondents would have us believe 
that like a stick of dynamite exploding, that it can only hurt one 
person; in this instance Vernon Cheever, President of Utah County 
Packing Company. The "exploding dynamite" are the fradulent repre-
sentations made by Seethaler, (see particularly the Affidavit of 
ARLIN DAVIS, Exhibit 21, page 90 of Appellant's Brief.) Cheever, as 
a personal guarantor heard it explode. 
On page 2 8 of Respondent's Brief the statement is made: 
The point of the Court's decision in this case is that 
Wilkerson,(citing-FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA v. 
PRUDENTIAL CARBON AND RIBBON COMPANY, 507 P2d 1026, Utah 
1973,) the guarantor, could not raise a defense that 
had vested in the debtor. 
That is true! Appellants are not raising the defense that 
had vested in the debtor (Utah County Packing) but rather the defense 
that had vested in the Appellants, the fraud committed on them in 
getting them to execute Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 of Appellant's Brief. 
Finally on page 29 the Respondents would have us believe that 
the Appellants herein do not have "standing". Attached hereto as 
Exhibit 1, is the complete text of JUNGK vs. HOLBROOK (emphasis added). 
See also page 6 and 7 of this Brief. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT REACHING 
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD IN THAT THE CORPORATIONS 
WERE BARRED AND CHEEVER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL, COULD 
NOT SEEK A REMEDY IN CONTRAST TO THAT SOUGHT 
AS A CORPORATE OFFICER; IN ANY EVENT, WHERE 
A GUARANTOR EXERCISING PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE 
AS TO BUSINESS OPERATIONS INHERENT TO THE 
CONTRACT, INSPECTS PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE CONTRACT, 
THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR APPLIES AND RELIANCE 
UPON THE OPINIONS OF THE SELLER ARE UNJUSTIFIED. 
All of Respondent's Arguments and cases under POINT V are in-
appropriate because they all relate to "questions of fact" which 
are to be determined at the time of trial and not by Summary Judgment, 
the basis of the appeal herein. Again, Appellant refers the Court 
to'the Affidavit of Arlin Davis, Exhibit 21, page 90 of Appellant's 
Brief. See also page 6-8 herein. 
POINT VI 
EVEN WERE CHEEVER PERMITTED TO BRING A 
SEPARATE ACTION AS GUARANTOR, HIS ALLEGATIONS OF 
MISTAKE AS TO THE TRUST DEED FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR RESCISSION. 
See p. 6-8 herein. 
POINT VII 
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES 
BY REASON OF APPELLANTS' FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Somebody ought to pay attorneys fees here when there is 815 
pages of pagenated record and the case is decided on Summary Judg-
ment. 
APPELLANT, MRS. CHEEVER 
The thrust of all of these arguments raised by the Respondents 
have to do with spurious defenses that attempts to keep this case 
going to a Jury Trial. There is nothing in the record to indicate 
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that Mrs. Cheever was involved in any of these "compromises", 
"waivers", or "settlements". 
STIPULATED ADDITION TO BRIEF 
Attached hereto, as Exhibit F, is the Stipulation entered 
into by Appellants and Respondents for addition to Briefs filed 
herein. 
Subsequent to the filing of the Brief herein, the Respondents 
sold the Appellants property pursuant to Notice of Trustee's Sale, 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, on the 9th day 
of April, 1985 at 11:00 a.m., as more fully set forth by the 
Trustee's Deed, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
Since the filing of appellants Brief, a new item of relief 
is sought in order to facilitate a final conclusion to this mat-
ter. 
Appellant is fearful that if they are successful in this 
appeal that a remand to the Lower Court may result in the Lower 
Court refusing to allow amendment to the Pleadings to remove the 
"cloud" on the title of the Appellants by reason of Exhibit B if 
the Appellants are also successful in the cause of action in the 
Lower Court. 
Page 26 should be substituted so that if the Appellants are 
successful in this Court, a remand will facilitate a "final dis-
position" without the expense and necessity of an additional 
appeal on the issue as to whether or not Appellant would be entitled 
to have the "cloud" removed if also successful in the Lower Court 
on remand on the original cause of action. 
The right of Quiet Title would also effect the right to Quiet 
Title against any persons taking by reason of the Defendants Deed, 
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Exhibit B. This necessarily follows by reason of the fact that 
Appellants, filed a Lis Pendens on the 29th day of February, 1984 
as set forth in Ehxibit C. Pursuant to the holding in HIDDEN MEA-
DOWS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. MILLS 590 P2d 1244, (Utah, 1979), 
the filing of Exhibit C had the effect of giving Notice to the 
world of Appellants Cause of Action. A copy of the complete 
text is attached hereto as Exhibit E. Also attached hereto is 
Exhibit D, Amended Lis Pendens, which gives notice to the world 
that there is an active pending case even though Summary Judgment 
was entered against the Plaintiffs and in favor of the Defendants 
on the 30th day of November, 19 84. (See bottom of page 2 of 
Exhibit D.) It should be noted that Exhibit D was not really nec-
essary for the reason thfct HIDDEN MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. 
MILLS, stands for the proposition that the Lis Pendens filed in 
the first instance survives the Appeal. The Court stated: 
The rule is well settled that, where a judgment 
is reversed and remanded with specific instruc-
tion or directions, the case stands in lower 
Court precisely as it did before a trial was 
had in the first instance. Hence, that very sit-
uation existed in the instant case as a result 
of our reversal and remand with directions to 
grant specific performance. Also, by so re-
versing, the Court has already recognized the 
full effectiveness of lis pendens pending appeal, 
(page 1248) 
For the reasons cited, this Court should allow the substi-
tution of page 26 in Appellants Brief and these arguments set 
forth herein should become a part of the Brief for the proposition 
that if the Appellants are successful on their Appeal herein, 
that the relief sought herein should include instructions to the 
Lower Court to follow the principles of law set forth in this 
Memorandum , page 9 and 10. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the Court should rule that Summary 
Judgment, was improperly granted, and the judgment of Lower 
Court reversed with all causes of action in place and that 
the Lower Court should seriously look to determining if the pre-
vailing party should be awarded Attorney Fees pursuant to 
Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code. 
That in the event the Appellants are successful on Appeal, 
tk&t Plaintiffs be allowed to file a Cause of Action for dam-
ages for the loss of the use of their property and for quieting 
Title to the Property in Plaintiffs by allowing amendments to 
Plaintiffs pleadings. 
DATED this /^> day of Hay, 19 85. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
KENNETH F, CLARKE 
:torney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
PLY BKTEF 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on N^ie_/^day of May, 1985, ten tri/e 
and correct copies of the RE RI OF APPELLANTS was mailed 
to the Supreme Court and four true and correct copies of tile 
same were mailed, postage prepaid, to JACKSON-HOWARD, H9* 
Lewis & Peterson, 120 East 300 North, Proved; Utah 846( 
ard, 
KENNETH F. CLARKE 
MADSEN, JEPSON, SALLENBACK & CLARKE 
Attorney at Law 
One East Center, Suite 300 
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Provo, Utah 84603 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON S. CHEEVER and MARTHA T. 
CHEEVER, husband and w i f e , UTAH 
COUNTY. PACKING ItfC.V'a- Utah 
C o r p o r a t i o n j C<tf,FSS BROTHERS, I N C . , THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. SESTHALER and MYRA Civil No. 64179 
K. SEETHALER, husband and wife 




COME NOW the Plaintiffs, VERNON S. CHEEVER and MARTHA 
T. CHEEVER, and for cause of action against the Defendants, com-
plain and allege as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. That on or about the 10th day of June, 1981, the Plain-
tiff, VERNON S. CHEEVER, individually, executed a TRUST DEED NOTE' 
wherein the Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHALER, 
were payees; a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part ' j 
{ 
hereof as if set forth herein at length and marked as Exhibit "A".)' 
2. That on or about the 10th day of June, 1981, the Plain-
tiffs, VERNON S. CHEEVER and MARTHA T. CHEEVER, executed a DEED OF 
TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS, wherein the Defendants, JOSEPH £. 
SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHLAER are listed as beneficiaries; a 
copy of which is attached hereto and m-ade a part hereof as if set 
forth, herein-at length and marked as Exhibit "3". 
3. That prior to the presentation of Exhibit "A" and "B" to the Plaintiffs, 
the Plaintiff, VERKN S. CHEEVER, had agreed with the Defendants, that he would 
be personally liable for the purchase from the Defendants, a neat packing 
business, limited to the extent of $25,000.00; that i t was the intent of the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendants that the individual liability of the Plaintiffs 
and the giving of collateral to secure that liability was to be 1 ivn*** to the 
extant of $25,000.00; the particulars of which are set forth on Exhibit D, attached 
hereto based upon reasonable belief. 
4. That the Plaintiff, at the tine of the execution of Exhibits "A" and 
"B", did not read the couLeuLs thereof before signing the same but relied upon 
the representation of the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIZR, that the said 
Exhibits did contain the express agieaueuL of the parties theretofore agreed to, 
and the Plaintiffs did believe, based upon the said representation of the De-
fendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHAUSl, which representation was material and which was 
false, that the said ubcuusnts did contain the agieMienl of the parties thereto-
fore agreed to* 
5. In fact, the documents referred to herein as Exhibits "A" and *B" did 
not contain the IMJL ••it. of toe parties theretofore agreed to, but in fact, 
onrrtviinert terms entirely contrary to the expressed agreement of the parties, 
which fact was known to the said Defendant, and to the said defendants agent. 
Defendant, SBCDRXW TTHZ MID ABSTRACT COWMW, who prepared the said documents, 
or, if said fact was not known by Defendant, JCSBPWA. SEETHAIER, constituted a 
mistake of fact en the pert of said Defendant in executing Exhibits "A" and "B". 
6. The Defendants *»"«* to disclose to the Plaintiffs the material 
differences between the documents referred to herein as Exhibits "A- and "B" 
and the actual agreement entered into by the parties prior to execution of 
Exhibits "A- and "B". 
7. That by reason of the mutual mistake of the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants, or by reason of the mistake of the Plaintiff or ignorance as to 
the contents of Ratfuhits "A" and "Ba, coupled with the fraud or material 
Bdsrapcesentation of the Defendants in concealing their knowledge of the 
contents thereof. Exhibits "A* and *B" ccnpletely failed to embody the actual 
a^seaspt of the parties; with liability of the Plaintiff, VEWCN S. OEEvER, 
Individually, was to be limited to $25,000.00 on Exhibit "A" and the collateral, 
the residence of the Plaintiffs* was given only to secure the individual 
liability of the Plaintiffs to the extent of $25,000.00 and Exhibit "B" should 
have been a second trust deed to the Defendants in the anoint of $25,000.00 and 
no s o n , subject to a first trust deed in favor of any entity of Plaintiffs 
choosing at any tine in the anount of $44,000.00. 
8. That the Plaintiffs executed Exhibits "A" and "B" in the belief that 
the sam^ embodied the actual a^ieauent theretofore made as hereinabove alleged. 
9. That by reason of the fraud of the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEEXBAIZR, 
who acted at al l times as agent for his wife, MESA K. SEEB&AER, the Plaintiffs 
have suffered great distress of body and mind and greatly injured and danwjpri 
in their credit standing and reputation by reason of the Defendants' acts in 
the asount of $50,000.00 each* 
10. Tbe acts of Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEE3HAUER, were malicious and said 
Defendant i s guilty of wanton disregard far the rights of and ccmsequences 
to the Plaintiffs and by reason thereof. Plaintiffs demand exemplary and 
punitive damages against the said Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEEIHAZZR, in the arouht 
Of PZFK TBODSMID ($50,000.00) DOUAFS «**. 
11. B a t the Plaintiffs have oeen required to obtain the services of 
an attorney to prosecute this action and that i t would be inequitable not 
to grant the Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fees and that the Osurt should 
enter an order granting'to the Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fees for the 
prosecution of this action and also as provided by .Section 73-27-56«. 
12. That the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIER, in causing the exhibit A 
and B to be prepared with the figure of $371,750.00, instead of the figure 
$25,000.00 and is ncnnTtinn of the same without informing plaintiffs other-
wise, made a representation that $25,000.00 was on exhibit A and B instead 
of $371,750.00 concerning presently existing material facts; which were 
false hpcytnse the true figure which should have been $25,000.00 instead of 
$371,750.00; which he either knew to be false, or his made recklessly, knowing 
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; 
for the' purpose of inducing the CEEEVEES to act upon his representation 
that exhibit A and B was only for $25,000.00 and not for $371,750.00; that 
the CBEE\EPS, acted reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of the said 
representation that exhibit A and B were for $25,000.00 and not for $371,750.00 
that the\CEEEVEFS did in fact rely upon said false representations that its 
contents reflected $25,000.00 and they had a right to rely upon the fact 
that the document prepared by the defendants, would literally conform to the 
agreement of $25,000.00 if no notice of the contrary was given. 
VKEEEFQIE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants as follows 
on the FUST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
1. That the Court decree that Exhibit "A" be reformed to declare that 
\E2MCN S. CHESTER i s individually l iable only to the extent of $25,000.00 
for any obligation owing to the Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIZR and MXRA K. 
SEETHAIZR* 
2. That the Court decree that Exhibit "B" be reformed, to show that the 
Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIZR and MZRA K. SEE1HAIZR, have a SECOND DEED 
OF TTOST limited to the extent of $25,000,00 and no more and subject to a 
FUST TTOST DEED in favor of an entity of plaintiffs choice at anytime in the 
amount of $44,000.00 and/or that Plaintiffs are entitled to the f i r s t $44,000.00 
equity in the property. 
3 . jn the alternative that the Court decree that Exhibits "A" and "B" be 
rescinded and that a l l parties be returned to their respective positions prior 
to wmrntim of Exhibits "A" and "B". 
4. That the Plaintiffs recover $50,000.00 general damages each against 
the Defendants and each of them. 
5. TSvat the Plaintiff be awarded exemplary and punitive damages in the 
amount of $50,000.00 each against the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIZR. 
6. That the Plaintiff be awarded a reasonable attorney's fees for the 
li'iivjieetjutinn of this action. 
7. For such other and further rel ief that i s just and equitable. 
SECOND CADSB OF ACTION 
As paragraphs 1 to 11 of this SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, Plaintiffs reallege 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 to 11 of the FUST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
12. Inat prior to the 10th day of June, 1981, the Defendant, JOSEPH A. 
SEETHAIZR, acting for himself and as agent for his wife, MXRA K. SEETBAIER, 
entered into negotiations for the sale of their meat packing plant to OTBH 
C0ONTT PACKING, INC., a Utah Corporation. 
(h) Said Defendant represented that the electrical system in the plant 
was in good operating condition; that in truth in fact; before a 
business license was issued to the Plaintiffs at or about $8,000.00 
was spent as condition to get a business license for electrical 
repairs. 
(i) Said Defendant represented that telephone system was in good 
operating condition; that in truth in fact, a whole new phone 
system had to be installed; that prior to the replacement, it was 
always being repaired. 
(j) Said Defendant represented that all of the three smoke houses in 
the plant were in good operating condition except for one clogged 
drain; in truth in fact, only one worked and coils had to be re-
placed to get the second to work but the toiler was not sufficient 
capacity to run three at once. 
00 The said Defendant represented that two of the three electric 
hoists in the plant were in good working .and operating condition 
and that the third hoist had all new parts and that siicply was in 
need of assembly; that in truth in fact, they did not work and 
had to be inmediately repaired. 
(1) The said Defendant represented that the reason for the red tags on 
the equipment in the package room was merely that the set of 
equipment was in need of "a little cleaning"; that in truth in fact, 
moisture was dripping off the ceiling and drip pans and suction fans 
had to be installed at great expense in order to remove the red tag 
placed by the meat inspectors. 
(m) Thfl said Defendant represented that, the elevatqr in the building 
was in good operable condition and had a value of $25,000.00; that 
in truth in fact, was in very poor condition and continually break* 
ing down on numerous occassions and of little value., 
(n) The said Defendant represented that the roof on the building was 
in good condition and was "fine, no problemN; that in truth in fact, 
it leaked in several place* and SEETHALZR had been warned' by the 
inspectors that water was dripping down the walls of the coolers and 
otherplaces and did in fact so drip* 
(o) The said Defendant represented that four Dodge trucks which were in-
cluded in the sale were refrigerated and in good working and operable 
condition; tiiat in truth in fact, only two were refrigerated and 
one of the two did not work. 
(p) The said Defendant represented that all six of the SCTIPS in the 
operation were in good condition; that in truth in fact, none of 
them would pass inspection by the DEPAKTMNT OF WEICSTS AND I€ASUEES 
without repair at great expense^ that repair was made at great expense. 
(q) the said Defendant represented that the Patty machines were in good 
operating condition except that "one of the machines needed a 
little repair*; that in truth in fact, neither worked, and a new 
one had to be purchased at an expense of $36,000.00. 
(r) The said Defendant represented that the "meat chopper" was working 
and in good working order and in good operable condition; that in 
truth in fact, it needed new bearings, belts, and controls at 
great expense. 
(s) The said Defendant/that the "Mince Master* was in good operable 
and working aondltion; that in truth in fact, it required numerous 
repairs and great time waiting for hard to find parts. 
(t) The said Defendant represented, that the "Bam Blender* was in good 
working and operating condition; that in truth in fact, paddle 
bearings were worn out and the machine was leaking rusty water and 
grease. 
(u) The said Defendant represented that the lunch meat slicer was in 
good operable and working condition and specifically represented 
that the said machine was working and that it could be set for any 
adjustment needed for the amount of slices required; that in truth 
in fact, immediate repairs of at or about $500.00 was required to 
have a new electrical control system and other repairs. 
(v) The said Defendant represented that the "weiner peeler* was in good 
operable and working condition; that in truth in fact, a new motor 
and vaccuun and pulleys and controls had to be replaced at great 
expense* 
(w) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging machine1' was in 
good operable and working condition and that in order to produce 
packages that would hang up on the walls for display that merely a 
die would need to be purchased. 
(x) The saJdiEefendant represented that the "boiler" was in good opera-
ting and working condition and further represented, "that's a good 
old boiler; better than the new one"; that in truth in fact, a 
year prior to sale, the controls did not work and six months before 
it almost blew up. In order to keep it working, it had to be 
*»-Hn«ri and new lines replaced. It was not of sufficient cap-
acity to run the three "smoke houses" at once. 
(y) Said Defendant represented that he owned the "tipper ^.es" and 
that the "tipper ties" were included in the sale and further that 
the 002 tank was owned by the said Defendant and included in the 
sale; that in truth in fact. Defendant did not own them. 
(z) Said Defendant represented that the "refrigeration system" was in 
good operable and working condition; that in truth in fact, the 
condensers were worn out; solenoid valves, coils, and pipes were 
old and rusted and continually leaked annania. Many other replace-
ments were made* 
(aa) Said Defendant represented that the "ice inker" was in good operable 
and working condition; that in truth in fact, it was junked after 
six months and after great expense and repair. 
(bb) She said Defendant represented that the "band saw" was in good 
operating and working condition; that in truth in fact, the 
bottom shaft and bearings were worn out and finally completely had to be 
overhauled. 
(cc) The said Defendant represented taht the "staple machines" were in 
good working and operating condition; that in truth in fact, they 
were worn out and had to be replaced within a few weeks. 
(dd) The said Defendant represented that the "hand slicer" was in good 
working and operating condition; that in truth and fact, it was 
worn out and bearing, blade, and motor had to be replaced. 
(ee) The said Defendant represented that the bade metal steps, big oak 
desk, garage jack, an office typewriter, lable addresser, a filing 
cabinet, a vise, several length of pipe, and sereral stainless 
steel buckets were all included in the sale agreement; that in 
truth in fact, defendant took them from the plant just prior to the 
sale* 
(ff) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging machine" was in 
good operable and working condition and that in order to produce 
packages that would hang up en the walls for display that merely a 
die would need to be purchased; that in truth in fact, it needed 
more than a new die; the machine was obsolete; the factory repre-
sentative stated, "new parts could not be obtained"; 002 leaked 
from tiie packages; the machine had to be replaced about 90 days 
from the purchase at an expense of at or about $61,000.00. 
That by reason of the aforesaid conduct, and the unmerchantable nature 
of the equipment, and breach of warranties of Defendants express and inplied 
UXSB GQQfIX PARING G C M N W INC,, a Utah Corporation, was imaKle to 
effectively carry en the business' sold by the Defendants and was unable to 
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realize a profit, all to Plaintiffs• injury. 
15. That the Plaintiffs, relying upon the fraudulent representations, 
warranties, and agreements of the Defendant, consented to guarantee the 
payment of $25,000.00 of the purchase price and no more. 
16* That the Plaintiffs would not have entered into guarantee $25,000.00 
of the purchase price but for the fruadulent representations of the Defendant, 
JOSEPH A. SEEXHAIZR, and if the Plaintiffs would have been informed of the true 
facts they never would have entered into any guarantee of any payment individually 
and would not have signed Exhibit A or B. Plaintiff, VEItOl S. CHEEVER, as 
President of Utah Cbutny Packing-Co. Inc., wouldn't have purchased said business 
but for saidrepresentationa which he relied upon which were false. 
17. That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the defendant, 
JOSEPH AJ* SEETHAIZR, the Plaintiffs have suffered great distress of body and 
mind and have been greatly injured and damaged in their credit standing and 
reputation and by reason thereof have been damaged in the sum of $50,000.00 
general rtanwgr»w each. 
18. The fraudulent acts of the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIZR, were mal-
icious and he was guilty of wanton disregard of the rights and consequences 
of the Plaintiffs and by reason thereof Plaintiffs demand exemplary and pun-
itive damages against said Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEEIHAIER, in the sum of 
%50,000.00 each. 
19. That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the Defendants, JOSEPH A. 
SEEIHAIER and VKBA. K. SEE3HALER, the Court or jury should decree that it is 
not equitable that the Plaintiffs be bound personally liable for the debt of 
Utah County Packing, Inc., and enter an order releasing them from their per-
sonal liability and their collateral described on Exhibit B and decree that 
Exhibit A 6 B aze void and of no effect. 
VHEREPOFJB, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants as follows 
on the SEOCND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
1. That the Court determine the amount of damages to be assessed against 
tha Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIER and MKRA K. SEETHAIER, by reason of their 
fraudulent conduct as it applied to Utah ODunty Packing Company Inc., and use 
the sane as set-off against any obligation that may. be determined to be owed 
by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIER and MORA K. SEETHAIER 
and to finally sake a determination as to the obligations of the Plaintiffs 
and the Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIER and MXRA K. SEETHAIER. 
2. That the Plaintiffs recover $50,000.00 general damages each against 
the Defendants and each of them inaddition to the foregoing paragraph. 
3. VOvat the Plaintiffs recover exemplary and punitive damages against the 
Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEEIHALER, in the sum of $50,000.00.. 
4. That the Court enter an order releasing plaintiffs from their 
collateral described on Exhibit B and decree that Exhibit A i B are void 
and of no effect. 
5. That the Court award a reasonable attorney's fee in favor of the 
Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the prosecution of this action. 
6. For such other and further relief as to the Court is just and proper. 
THIRD CA05E OF ACTIO? 
As paragraphs 1 to 19 of the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION, Plaintiff realleges 
paragraphs 1 to Id of the SECOND GAOSE OF ACTION. 
20. That tiie negotiations between the Plaintiff and Defendant *ers not 
supported by consideration and not sufficient to constitute a contract between 
the parties in that there was no meeting of the minds and no agreement was 
reached and the Court should decree that Exhibit A & B are void and of no 
effect. 
WEHEFQI&, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendants as follows 
on the THUS) OUJSE OP ACITCN. 
J.Biat the Plaintiffs reoover $50,000.00 general damages each against 
the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEE3HAIER. 
2. That the Plaintiffs recover exenplary and punitive damages against 
the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEE2BKLER, in the sum of $50,000.00 each. 
3. That the Osurt enter an order releasing Plaintiffs from their personal 
liability and their collateral described on Exhibit B and decree that Exhibit 
A 6 B are void and of no effect. 
4. That the Osurt award a reasonable attorney's fee in favor of the 
Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the prosecution of this action. 
5. for such other and further relief as to the Court is just and proper* 
FODREH CN3SE OF ACTIO! 
As to paragraphs 1-19 of the FOCKm GMD5E QF ACTIO!, plaintiff realleges 
paragraphs 1 to 19 of the SEOCND CAUSE OF ACTICN. 
20. That the Defendants had notice of the true facts of the condition of 
the equipment and drcunstances heretofore alleged* 
21. That it would be inequitable for the Defendants to now claim any 
right or interest under Exhibits A or B and are therefore estopped frcm 
claiming any right or interest under Exhibits A or B and both should be declared 
void* 
22. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at la*. 
WESEFOFE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgnent against the Defendants as follows 
on the PODHIH CADSE CF ACTTCNe. 
1* That the Cburt determine that it would be inequitable for the 
Defendants to claim any* right or interest under Exhibit A or B and that they 
are estopped from claiming any right or interest to Exhibit A or B. 
2. That the Plaintiffs reoover $50,000.00 general damages each against 
the Defendants and each of them. 
3. That the Plaintiffs recover exemplary and punitive damages against 
the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER>' in the sum of $250,000.00 each. 
4. That the ODurt enter an order releasing Plaintiffs from their 
collateral described on Exhibit B and decree that Exhibit A 6 B are void and 
of no effect. 
5. That the ODurt award a reasonable attorney's fee in favor of the 
Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the prosecution of this action. 
6. For such other and further relief as to the Oourt is just and proper. 
FlfcTH CAUSE OP ACTION 
As to paragraphs 1 to 19 of this FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION, Plaintiffs re-
allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 to 19 of the SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
20. That on or about the 30th day of March, 2983, the Defendant, SECURITY 
TTTTZ AND ABSTRACT COJKWT, filed a NOTICE OF DEEAEILE/ a copy of idiich is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C and made a part hereof as is set forth herein 
at length* 
21. That no sale of the said, property has yet been conducted pursuant to 
the said NOTICE OF DEFAULT. 
22. That the Defendants, are threatening to, pursuant to section 
57-1-25 of the Utah Code, to sell the said property at trustees sale; no 
NOTICE OF THDSTEB SAIZ has yet'been filed nor has .any publication yet been 
made pursuant to tee statute. 
23. That an unfair advantage has been gained by the Defendants, 
SEETHALEBS, through their fraud, and/or the mutual mistake of the parties, 
and that it is against good conscience to let the mistake stand and it 
would be inequitable to allow the foreclosure of the property set forth in 
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Exhibit "B" and the Cburt should issue an oxder enjoining the Defendants 
from continuing with the foreclosure including injunction, restraining order, 
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or such other means as 
would be just and equitable. 
24. That Section 57-1-23 of the Utah Code, which gives to a beneficiary 
an option to foreclose trust deeds as provided for foreclosure of mortgages of 
Baal Property, without providing the sans right to the Plaintiff, is a viola-
tion of the due process and equal pLDtPt.il.-inn clauses aa provided by the 14th 
amendment of the 0.3. Oansititutionj the Court should decree that the Plaintiff 
has the sane right and the Oourt ahould decree that judicial foreclosure be 
made of the proeprty in lieu of the statutory foreclosure undertaken by De-
zancLBncse 
25; That it is inequitable that Defendants should be allowed by non-
judicial sale to foreclose the property; that the Cburt should decree that 
the property be foreclosed "in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure 
of mortgages on Real Property • 
26. Plaintiff has no adequate randy at latt or otherwise to prevent 
the harm or damage threatened by the defendants by reason of their threat 
to sell the said property, without the Oanrt hearing the case on its merits 
and this Oaurt should restrain and prevent the foreclosure sale on said 
property until this action is resolved on the merits. 
27. Plaintiff will suffer irreparable haxm, damage, and injury, unless 
the acts and conduct of the Defendant above onnplained of or enjoined, because 
the property would be sold without the Plaintiffs being able to assert their 
defenses as herein set forth in this ocsplaint. 
28. The hereinmentioned property is the homestead of the Plaintiffs and 
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qualifies as exempt property under the Utah Homestead Act within the statute 
provisions of the act. 
MBEREHORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against the Defendants as allows: 
1. That a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER issue restraining Defendants, their 
servants and employees from proceeding vdth any TRUSTEE SAIE, until a hearing 
is had on Plaintiffs application for a preliminary injunction and restraining 
the Defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, during the pending of 
thijs arrHon from continuing the foreclosure of the property on Exhibit B of 
the Complaint or ptoonerting further under Exhibit C of the Complaint by sale 
or otherwise* 
2. That a preliminary injunction issue enjoining the Defendants, their 
•exvauLa and employees from proceeding with any TRUSTEE SAI2, or publishing 
notice of same, during the pendency of this action and restraining the 
Defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, during the pendency of 
this action from continuing the foreclosure of the property on Exhibit B 
of the Complaint or proceeding further under Exhibit C of the Cjomplaint by sale 
or otherwise. 
3. That on a final hearing, defendants, and their agents, servants 
and employees, be permanently enjoined from proceeding with any TRUSTEE SAIE, 
or publication of notice thereof and restraining the ?Defendants their agents, 
servants, and employees, during the pendency of this action from continuing 
the foreclosure of the property on Exhibit B of the Complaint or proceeding 
further under Exhibit C of the Onplaint by sale or otherwise. 
4. That the Court issue an order that a Judicial Jbreclosure "in the 
wawwr provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on Real Property4* 
be made of the property in lieu of the sunmary and non-judicial foreclosure 
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undertaken by the Defendants. 
5. That the Plaintiff receive aosts and expenses incurred herein. 
6. That the Plaintiff receives such other additional relief as nay 
seem just and equitable to the Court. 
SIXTH CAP5B CF ACTIO? 
As paragraphs 1-28 of this SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION, Plaintiffs reallege 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-28 of the FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTIO}. 
29. That by reason of the allegations set forth herein, the affidavits 
on file herein, the deposition of JOSEPH A. SEETHALEF, filed herein, a 
dispute and actual controversy now exists between the Plaintiffs and the De-
fendants as to the Plaintiffs rights, duties and obligations as to Exhibits 
A and B; until such dispute is settled, Defendant should not be allowed to 
proceed>with foreclosure and the Plaintiffs cannot property determine their 
rights and obligations under Exhibits A and B. 
30. Plaintiffs have made an application with DESESET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCZATiaN of Salt Lake City, Utah to obtain a $44,000.00 loan to be 
secured by a First Trust Dead to DESESET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION. 
31. The Bpwriflc mnttur in dispute is set forth herein and in the file 
herein. 
32. This SIXTH CA05E OF\ACnCN is brought under IDLE 57 of the Utah Pules 
of Civil Procedure. 
WEHEF0RE, Plaintiff prays as follows: 
1. For a judgment declaring the rights, duties and legal relations of 
the Plaintiff and Defendants with regards to Exhibit A and B so that the 
Plaintiff can determine their rights and duties thereunder, and if they can 
grant a FIRST TTOST DEED in the amount of $44,000.00 to l.ftihKHb*r FEDERAL 
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SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION. 
2. That the Court decree that Exhibit "B" be reformed, to 
show that the Defendants, JOSEPH A, SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHALER, 
have a SECOND DEED OF TRUST limited to the extent of $25,000.00 and 
no more and subject to a FIRST TRUST DEED in favor of an entity of 
Plaintiffs choice at anytime in the amount of $44,000.00. 
3. That the Plaintiffs recover $50,000.00 general damages each 
against the Defendants, the SEETHALERS, and each of them. 
4* That the plaintiff be awarded exemplary and punitive 
damages in the amount of $50,000.00 each against the Defendant, 
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER. 
5. That the Plaintiff be awarded a reasonable attorney's fees 
for the prosecution of this action. 
6. For such other and,further relief that is just and equitable* 
COME NOW the Plaintiff, UTAH COUNTY PACKING INC., a Utah Corp-
oration, and for cause of action against the Defendants, complain 
and allege as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. That on or about the 10th day of June, 1981, VERNON S. 
CHEEVER, as President of the Plaintiff, Utfch County Packing Inc., 
executed a TRUST DEED NOTE wherein the Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEET-
HALER and MYRA K. SEETHALER, were payees? a copy of which is 
attached hereto and made a part hereof as if set forth herein at 
length and marked as Exhibit "A". 
2. That prior to the 10th day of June, 1981, the Defendant, 
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, acting for himself and as agent for his wife, 
MYRA. K. SEETHALER, entered into negotiations for the sale of their 
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..t pacfcin, * * .to the Plainti«. « « • « « SACKIKG. INC.. . 
Utah Corporation* 
3. That in the course of the negotiations, the Defendant, 
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, made representations; concerning presently 
existing material facts; which were false; which he either knew 
to be false, or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representations; for the purpose 
of inducing UTAH COUNTY PACXING INC. to act upon his representa-
tions; that the UTAH COUNTY PACKING INC., acted reasonably and in 
ignorance of the falsity of the said representations; that did in 
fact rely upon said false representations; that by reason thereby, 
it was induced to be liable on the sale; that by reason of agree-
ing to be liable on the sale it has been greatly injured and 
damaged. The representations refer- to include, but are not 
limited to: 
(a) The Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, represented that 
the plant and all equipment therein was "in top working 
condition"; that in truth and fact, it was not for the 
reasons hereafter cited. 
(b) Said Defendant represented that "everything was new 
or better than new because of the maintenance program"; 
that in truth in fact, he had no maintenance program other 
than to keep it running; there was no regular lubrication 
program; lubrication was not performed daily. 
(c) The said Defendant represented that in order to operate 
the beef cooler that all was needed was to turn on a valve 
and that the coolers werw all in good operating condition, 
and that the reason that the said coolers were not cold 
at the time of that conversation was because the said 
Defendant had turned them down, that he did not need them 
cold; that in truth in fact, the system was so worn out 
that the coil was ruptured and would not work and had to 
be replaced. 
(d) Said Defendant represented that the electrical system 
in the plant was in good operating condition; that in truth 
in fact; before a business license was issued to the Plain-
tiffs at or about $8,000.00 was spent as condition to get a 
business license for electrical repairs. 
(e) Said Defendant represented that telephone system was 
in good operating condition; that in truth in fact, a whole 
new phone system had to be installed; that prior to the re-
placement, it was always being repaired. 
(f) ^aid Defendant represented that all of the three smoke 
houses In" the plant were in good operating condition except 
for one clogged drain; in truth in fact, only one worked and 
coils had to be replaced to get the second to work but the 
boiler was not sufficient capacity to run three at once. 
(g) The said Defendant represented that two of the three 
electric hoists in the plant were in good working and oper-
ating condition and that the third hoist had all new parts 
and that simply was in need of assembly; that in truth in 
fact, they did not work and had to be immediately repaired. 
(h) The said Defendant represented that the reason for 
the red tags on the equipment in the package room was merely 
that the set of equipment was in need of "a little cleaning"; 
that in truth in fact, moisture was dripping off the ceiling 
and drip pans and suction fans had to be installed at great 
expense in order to remove the red tag placed by the meat 
inspectors. 
(i) The said Defendant represented that the elevator in the 
building was in good operable condition and had a value of 
$25,000^00; that in truth in fact, was in very poor condition 
^nd continually breaking down on numerous occassions and of 
little value. 
(j) The said Defendant represented that the roof on the 
building was in good condition and was "fine, no problem"; 
that in truth in fact, it leaked in several places and 
SEETHALER had been warned by the inspectors that water was 
dripping down the walls of the coolers and other places and 
did in fact so drip. 
(k) The said Defendant represented that four Dodge trucks 
which were included in the sale were refrigerated and in good 
working and operable condition; that in truth in fact, only 
two were refrigerated and one of the two did not work. 
(1) The said Defendant represented that all six of the scales 
in the operation were in good condition; that in truth in 
fact, none of them would pass inspection by the DEPARTMENT OF 
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES without repair at great expense; that 
repair was made at great expense. 
(m) The said Defendant represented that the Patty machines 
were in good operating condition except that "one of the 
machines needed a little repair"; that in truth in fact, 
neither worked, and a new one had to be purchased at an 
expense of $36,000.00. 
(n) The said Defendant represented that the "meat chopper* 
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was working and in good working order and in good operable 
condition; that in truth in fact, it needed new bearings, belts 
and controls at great expense. 
(o) The said Defendant represented that the "mince master" 
was in good operable and working condition? that in truth in 
fact, it required numerous repairs and great time waiting 
for hard to find parts. 
(p) The said Defendant represented that the "ham blender" 
was in good working and operating condition; that in truth 
in fact, paddle bearings were worn dut and the machine was 
leaking rusty water and grease. 
(q) The said Defendant represented that the lunch meat slicer 
was in good operable and working condition and specifically 
represented that the said machine was working and that it 
could be set for any adjustment needed for tne amount of 
slices required; that in truth in fact, immediate repairs of 
at or about $500.00 was required to have a new electrical 
control system and other repairg. 
(r) The said Defendant represented that the "weiner peeler" 
was in good operable and working condition; that in truth in 
fact, a new motor and vaccuum and pulleys and controls had 
to be replaced at great expense. 
(s) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging 
machine" was in operable and working condition and Chat--.in 
order to produce packages that would hang'>up on the walls for 
display that merely a die would need to be purchased. 
(t) The said Defendant represented that the "boiler" was in 
good operating and working condition and further represented, 
"that's a good old boiler; better than* the new one"; that 
in truth in fact, a year prior to sale, the controls did not 
work and six months before, it almost blew up. In order to 
keep it working, it had to be delimed and new lines replaced. 
It was not of sufficient capacity to run the three "smoke 
houses" at once. 
(u) Said Defendant represented that he o*med the "tipper 
ties" and that the "tipper ties" were include^ in the sale 
and further that the C02 tank was owned by the sair» nefendant 
and included in the sale; that in truth in fact, Defendant 
not own them. 
(v) Said Defendant, represented that the "refrigeration 
system" was in good operable and working condition; that in 
truth in fact, the condensors were worn out; solenoid valves, 
coils, and pipes were old and rusted and continually leaked 
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amonia. Many other replacements were made. 
(w) Said Defendant represented that the "ice maker" was in 
good operable and working condition; that in truth in fact, 
it was junked after six months and after great expense and 
repair. 
(x) The said Defendant represented that the "band saw" was 
in good operating and working condition; that in truth in 
fact, the bottom shaft and bearings were worn out and finally 
completely had to be overhauled. 
(y) The said Defendant represented that the "staple 
machines" were in good working and operating condition; that 
in truth in fact, they were worn out and had to be replaced 
within a few weeks. 
(2) The said Defendant represented that the "hand slicer" 
was in good working and operating condition; that in truth 
and fact, it was worn out and bearing, blade, and motor had 
to be replaced. 
(aa) The said Defendant represented that the back metal steps, 
big oak desk, garage jack, an office typewriter, lable 
addresser, a filing cabinet, a vise, several length of pipe, 
and several stainless steel buckets were all included in the 
sale agreement; that in truth in fact, defendant took them from 
the plant just prior to the sale. 
(bb) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging 
maching" was in good operable and working condition and that 
in order to produce packages that would hang up on the walls 
for display that merely a die would need to be purchased; 
that in truth in fact, it needed more than a new die; the 
machine was obsolete; the factory representative stated, "new 
parts could not be obtained"; C02 leaked from the packages; 
the machine had to be replaced about 90 days from the purchase 
at an expense of at or about $61,000.00. 
4- That by reason of the aforesaid conduct, and the unmer-
chantable nature of the equipment, and breach of warranties of 
Defendants express and implied UTAH COUNTY PACKING COMPANY INC., 
a Utah Corporation, was unable to effectively carry on the bus-
iness sold by the Defendants and was unable to realize a profit, 
all to Plaintiffs1 injury. • 
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5. That the Plaintiffs, relying upon the fraudulent repre-
sentations, warranties, and agreements of the Defendant, consented 
to agree to payment of Exhibit "AH. 
6* That the Plaintiffs would not have entered into Exhibit 
"A" but for the fraudulent representations of the Defendant, 
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, and if the Plaintiffs would have been informed 
of the true facts, it never would have entered into Exhibit "A,f. 
VERNON S. CHEEVER, as President of Utah County Packing Co. Inc., 
wouldn't have purchased said business but for said presentations 
which he relied upon which were false. 
7. That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the Defendant, 
JOSEPH A. SEETHLAER, the Plaintiffs have suffered great damage 
in the sum of $150,000.00 general damages. 
8. The fraudulent acts of the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEET-
HALER, were malicious and he was guilty of wanton disregard of the 
rights and consequences of the Plaintiffs and by reason thereof 
Plaintiffs demand exemplary and punitive damages against said 
Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, in the sum of $50,000.00. 
9. That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the De-
fendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHALER, the Court or 
jury should decree that it is not equitable that the Plaintiffs 
be bound liable on Exhibit "A" and enter an order releasing it 
from their liability on Exhibit "A" and decree that Exhibit "A" 
is of no effect. 
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10. That the Plaintiffs have been required to obtain the 
services of an attorney to prosecute this action and that it would 
be inequitable not to grant the Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's 
fees and that the Court should enter an order granting to the 
Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of 
this action and also as provided by Section 78-27-56. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants 
as follows on the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
1. That the Plaintiffs recover $150,000.00 general damages 
against the Defendants and each of tnem. 
2. That the Plaintiff recover exemplary and punitive damages 
against the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER,. in the sum of $50,000.00. 
3. That the Court enter an order releasing Plaintiffs from 
liability on Exhibit "A" and decree that Exhibit "A" is void and 
of no effect. 
4. That the Court award a reasonable attorney's fee in 
favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the prose-
cution of this action. 
5. For such other and further relief as to the Court is 
just and proper. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. That on or about the 18th day of June, 1981, the Plaintiff 
paid to the Defendant, JOSEPH SEETHALER, the sum of $10,822.70 as 
evidenced by a check, a copy of which is attached hereto as exhibit 
"F". 
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2. That the check was given by mistake, coersion, to the 
said defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, and without a valuable con-
sideration and constituted an UNJUST ENRICHMENT for the reason 
that the said was paid to him for payment of accounts receivables 
which were sold with the business and for which the Defendant is 
now indebted to this Plaintiff for the sum of $10,822.70, together 
with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from June 18, 
1981. 
3. That the Plaintiff has been required to obtain the 
services of an attorney to prosecute this action and it would be 
inequitable not to grant the Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees 
and that the Court should enter an order granting to the Plaintiff 
a reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of this action 
*wd «l»e «» pnavivtoU by Section 7S-2?-5$ of the UCA. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendant 
on the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION in the amount of $10,822.70, together 
with interest thereon at the rate of 10% from the 18th day of June, 
1981, together with attorney's fees, costs of Court and such other 
and further relief as is just and equitable. 
COME NOW THE Plaintiff, COLES BROTHERS, INC., a Utah Corpor-
ation, and for cause of action against the Defendants, complain 
and allege as follows: 
1. That on or about the 10th day of June, 1981, BRUCE H. 
COLES, as Secretary/Treasurer of the Plaintiff, Utah County Packing, 
Inc., executed a TRUST DEED NOTE wherein the Defendants, JOSEPH A. 
SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHALER, were payees; a copy of which is 
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attached hereto and made a part hereof as if set forth herein at 
length and marked as Exhibit "A". 
2. That prior to the 10th day of June, 1981, the Defendant, 
JOSEPH A* SEETHALER, acting for himself and as agent for his wife, 
MYRA K. SEETHALER, entered into negotiations for the sale of their 
meat packing plant to UTAH COUNTY PACKING, INC., a Utah Corporation. 
3# That in the course of thenegotiations, the Defendant, JOSEPH 
A. SEETHALER, made representations; concerning presently existing 
material facts; which were false; which he either knew to be false, 
or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representations; for the purpose of inducing 
COLES BROTHERS, INC., to act upon his representations; that COLES 
BROTHERS, INC., acted reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity 
of the said representations; that did in fact rely upon said false 
representations; that by reason thereby, it was induced to be liable 
on the sale; that by reason of agreeing to be liable on the sale 
it has been greatly injured and damaged. The representations re-
ferred to include, but are not limited to: 
(a) The Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, represented that 
the plant and all equipment therein was "in top working 
condition9; that in truth and fact, it waa not for the 
reasons hereafter cited. 
(b) Said Defendant represented that "everything was new 
or better than new because of the maintenance proq^am"; 
that in truth in fact, he had no maintenance program other 
than to keep it running; there was no regular lubrication 
program; lubrication waa not performed daily. 
(c) The said Defendant represented that in order to operate 
the beef cooler that all waa needed was to turn on a valve 
and that the coolers werw all in good operating condition
 9 
and that the reason that the said coolers were not cold 
at the time of that conversation was because the said 
Defendant had turned them down, that he did not need then 
cold; that in truth in fact, the system was so worn out 
that the coil was ruptured and would not work and had to 
te*e r«T»l3jced-
,-, — WL.na.ne r.pr...nted that «*• i E ^ f i ? ' U S . 
in the plant was in good operating conditio^ ^ S h . Plain-
in fact; before a business license was l s a u^.^° ^ ?
 t 
tiffs at or about $8,000.00 was spent as condition to get a 
business license for electrical repairs. 
(e) Said Defendant represented that telephone system was 
in good operating condition; that in truth in fact, a whole 
new phone system had to be installed? that prior to the re-
placement, it was always being repaired. 
(f) Said Defendant represented that all of the three unto 
houses in the plant were in good operating ^ n d l t l o n ^ e ^ 
for one clogged drain; in truth in fact, only one worked and 
coils had to be replaced to get the second to work but the 
boiler was not sufficient capacity to run three at once. 
(g) The said Defendant represented that two of the three 
electric hoists in the plant were in good working and oper-
ating condition and that the third hoist had all new parts 
and that simply was in need of assembly; that in truth in 
fact, they did not work and had to be immediately repaired. 
(h) The said Defendant represented that the reason for 
the red tags on the equipment in the package room was merely 
that the set of equipment was in need of "a little cleaning*; 
that in truth in fact, moisture was dripping off the ceiling 
and drip pans and suction fans had to be installed at great 
expense in order to remove the red tag placed by the meat 
inspectors. 
(i) The said Defendant represented that the elevator in the 
building was in good operable condition and had a value of. 
$25,000*00; that in truth in fact, was in very poor conditioi 
and continually breaking down on numerous occassions and of 
little value. 
(j) The said Defendant represented that the roof on the 
building was in good condition and was "fine, no problem19; 
that in truth in fact, it leaked in several places and 
SEETHALER had been warned by the inspectors that water was 
dripping down the walls of the coolers and other places and 
did in fact so drip. 
Ik) The said Defendant represented that four Dodge trucks 
which were included in the sale were refrigerated and in good 
working and operable condition; that in truth in fact, only 
two were refrigerated and one of the two did not work. 
(1) The said Defendant represented that all six oi the scales 
in the operation were in good condition; that in truth in 
fact, none of them would pass inspection by the DEPARTMENT OP 
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES without repair at great expense; that 
repair was made at great expense* 
(m) The said Defendant represented that the Patty machines 
were in good operating condition except that -one of the 
machines needed a little repair"; that in truth in fact, 
neither worked, and a new one had to be purchased at an 
expense of $36,000.00• 
(n) The said Defendant represented that the •meat chopoer* 
was working and in good working order and in good operable 
condition; that in truth in fact, it needed new bearings, belts 
and controls at great expense. 
(o) The said Defendant represented that the "mince master*1 
was in good operable and working condition; that in truth in 
fact, it required numerous repairs and great time waiting 
for hard to find parts. 
(p) The said Defendant represented that the "ham blender" 
was in good working and operating condition; that in truth 
in fact, paddle bearings were worn but and the machine was 
leaking rusty water and grease. 
(q) The said Defendant represented that the lunch meat slicer 
was in good operable and working condition and specifically 
represented that the said machine was working and that it 
could be set for any adjustment needed for the amount of 
slices required; that in truth in fact, immediate repairs of 
at or about $500.00 was required to have a new electrical 
control system and other repair?. 
(r) The said Defendant represented that the "weiner peeler" 
was in good operable and working condition; that in truth in 
fact, a new motor and vaccuum and pulleys and controls had 
to be replaced at great expense* 
(s) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging 
machine" was in operable and working condition and Chat..in 
order to produce packages that would hang >up on the walls for 
display that merely a die would need to be purchased. 
(t) The said Defendant represented that the "boiler" was in 
good operating and working condition and further represented, 
"that's a good old boiler; better thain • the new one"; that 
in truth in fact, a year prior to sale, the controls did not 
work and six months before, it almost blew up. In order to 
keep it working, it had to be delimed and new lines replaced. 
It was not of sufficient capacity to man the three "smoke 
houses" at once. 
(u) Said Defendant represented that he o»me<?. the "tipper 
ties" and that the "tipper ties" were include** in the sale 
and further that the C02 tank was owned by the sai^ 1 nefendant 
and included in the sale; that in truth in f?.ct. Defendant 
not own them. 
(v) Said Defendant represented that the "refrigeration 
system" was in good operable and working condition; that in 
truth in fact, the condensors were worn out? solenoid valves, 
coils, and pipes were old and rusted and continually leaked 
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amonia. Many other replacements were made. 
(w) Said Defendant represented that the "ice maker" was in 
good operable and working condition; that in truth in fact, 
it was junked after six months and after great expense and 
repair. 
(x) The said Defendant represented that the "band saw" was 
in good operating and working condition; that in truth in 
fact, the bottom shaft and bearings were worn out and finally 
completely had to be overhauled* 
(y) The said Defendant represented that the "staple 
machines" were in good working and operating condition; that 
in truth in fact, they were worn out and had to be replaced 
within a few weeks. 
(z) The said Defendant represented that the "hand slicer" 
was in good working and operating condition; that in truth 
and fact, it was worn out and bearing, blade, and motor had 
to be replaced. 
(aa) The said Defendant represented that the back metal steps, 
big oak desk, garage jack, an office typewriter, lable 
addresser, a filing cabinet, a vise, several length of pipe, 
and several stainless steel buckets were all included in the 
sale agreement; that in truth in fact, defendant took them from 
the plant just prior to the sale. 
(bb) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging 
maching" was in good operable and working condition and that 
in order to produce packages that would hang up on the walls 
for display that merely a die would need to be purchased; 
that in truth in fact, it needed more than a new die; the 
machine was obsolete; the factory representative stated, "new 
parts could not be obtained"; C02 leaked from the packages; 
the machine had to be replaced about 90 days from the purchase 
at an expense of at or about $61,000.00. 
4j That by reason of the aforesaid conduct, and the unmer-
chantable nature of the equipment, and breach of warranties of 
Defendants express and implied UTAH COUNTY PACKING COMPANY INC., 
a Utah Corporation, was unable to effectively carry on the bus-
iness sold by the Defendants and was unable to realize a profit, 
•11 to Plaintiffs1 injury. 
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5. That the Plaintiffs, relying upon the fraudulent representa-
tions , warranties, and agreements of the Defendant, consented 
to agree to payment of Exhibit "A". 
6. That the Plaintiffs would not have entered into Exhibit "A" . 
but for the fraudulent representations of the Defendant, JOSPEH 
A. SEETHALER, and if the Plaintiffs would have been informed of 
the true facts, it never would have entered into Exhibit "A". 
7* That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the Defendant, 
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, the Plaintiffs have suffered great damage in 
the sum of $150f000.00 general damages. 
8. The fraudulent acts of theDefendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, 
were malicious and he was guilty of wanton disregard of the 
rights and consequences of the Plaintiffs and by reason thereof 
Plaintiffs demand exemplary and punitive damages against said 
Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHLAER, in the sum of $50,000.00. 
9. That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the Defendants, 
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER AND MYRA K. SEETHALER, the Court or jury 
should decree that it is not equitable that the Plaintiffs be 
bound liable on Exhibit "A" and enter an order releasing it from 
their liability on Exhibit "A" and decree that Exhibit "A" is of 
no effect. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants 
as follows. 
1. That the Plaintiffs recover $150,000.00 general damages 
against the Defendants and'each of them. 
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2. That the Plaintiff recover exemplary and punitive damages 
against the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, in the sum of 
$50,000.00. 
3. That the Court enter an order releasing Plaintiffs from 
liability on Exhibit "A" and decree that Exhibit "A" is void and 
of no effect. 
4. That the Court award a reasonable attorney's fee in 
favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the pro-
secution of this action. 
5. For such other and further relief as to the Court is 
just and proper. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was hand delivered to the Law office of JACKSON 
HOWARD, 120 E. 3Q0 No., Provo, Utah on the /<? "S^day of 
July, 1984, and also to the law office of ROBERT MOODY, 55 
East Center, Provo, Utah on the same date. 




NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
The following describe*! property will lie r.old at public auction to the highest bidder on the 3 l ! l _ 
day of J^EEii , ML-55- at .il?-Qil. A.M. at the front door of tine ...JUlnlt County Court 
House at }£?*» , Utah lit the County of _ - R « k -... . INSECURITY TITLE & ABSTRACT 
CO. . as Trustee under the Peed of Trust wade by .Ventou s i ^^^y^^?i!lLMa«Jia.T._Cbv«vcr, 
„ as Trustors, and recorded Ji'lliL *i-»- i ? 5 i . WL*— fts Entry No. 16973" In Hook 121SL at paRes 6 9 6 of the Offirlal KecortLt of .v.**1.!*-. 
County. Utah, given to secure an Indebtedness In favor of J 2 2 £ ! * A i - ^ E l ' ^ J » L 4 i S Z £ « J ^ « 
S p l i n t e r .
 ( n o w owwd a n d l | c M , i y Joseph A. Scuthalcr and Hyra K. Seethaler 
by reason of the breach of certain obligations secured thereby. 
Notice of Default was recorded March 29, 198A
 a s yMiry No. - J 2 £ ? in jjoofc 1X21 
at page J20JL of said Official Records. Trustoo will sell at public auction to the highest bidder for cash, 
payable In lawful money of the United States at the time of sale, without warranty as to title, possesion 
or encumbrances, the following described property at ,15AU^ikJUlH?. NprUl , In the City of 
P'^vo , County of U^ii State of Utah: 
All of Lot 3, Plat "A", Marjorie Manor Subdivision, Proyo, Utah, according 
to tha official plat thereof ou file in the oTflce of lite itccordcr, ULah 
County, Utah. 
for the purpose of paying obligations secured by said Deed of Tiust Including fees, charges and expenses 
of Trustee, advances, if any, under th« terms of nald DeaU Interest theieon and the unpaid principal of 
the Note secured by said Deed of Trust with Interest thereon as in r.ald Note and l>y law provided. 
Dated:. Hatch A, 1985 
55 I'.ast Cunt i*r 
I'rovo, Utah 8A601 
SKCUKITY &)AI1STKACT CO. , Trustee 
Ri'X (h^llfitisoii 
President Its 
12 (R 3-7*1 
TO*? 









Joseph A. Seethaler 
3655 Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
. S P A C E ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDERS U S E . 
TRUSTEE'S DEED 
AND ABSTRACT 
THIS DEED, made by SFCURITY TITl E/COMPANY as Trustee under the hereinafter mentioned 
Deed of Trust (herein called Trustee), and JOSEPH A. SEETHALER and MYRA K. SRETHAT.F.R > 
(herein called Grantee). WITNESSETH 
Vernon S. Cheever and Martha T. Cheever WHEREAS, 
.at pages 696, 
, and Recorded Jnna 11,.-19fll- _ a s E n t r > No 
.of Official Records, in the office of the County Recorder 
by Deed of Trust dated , 
16973 .nRnnk 1918 
nf Utah rmmty State of Utah, did grant and convey to said Trustee upon the Trusts therein ex-
pressed, the property hereinafter described to secure, among other obligations, pa>ment of a certain promts^  
sory note and interest, according to the terms thereof other sums of money advanced, and interest therqon, 
and, 
WHEREAS, breach and default was made under the terms of said Deed of Trust in the particulars set 
forth in the Notice of Default duly served and recorded; and, 
WHEREAS, the then Beneficiary or holder of said note did execute and deliver to Trustee written decla-
ration of default and demand for sale, and, 
WHEREAS, Trustee, in consequence of said declaration of default, election and demand for sale, and in 
compliance with the terms of said Deed of Trust did execute its Notice of Trustee's Sale stating that it, as such 
Trustee, by virtue of the authority in it vested, would sell at public auction to the highest bidder for cash, in 
lawful money of the United States, the property particularly therein and hereinafter described, said proptrt) ^ 
being in the County of , State of Utah, and fixing the time and place of sale as Apri l . 9^JL985 ^ fe 
at 11*00 A M of said day, and did cause copies of said Notice to be posted for not less than twenty days 
before the date of sale herein fixed, in three public places in the said City of PrQVQ , wherein said 
property was to be sold, and also two in convptcuous places on the property to be sold and said Trustee did 
cause a copy of said Notice to be published once a week for three consecutive wtcks before the date of sale 
therein fixed in The Dal ly Herald 
a newspaper of general circulation, printed and published in the city or township in which said real property 
is situated, the first date of such publication being .March 3» 1985 and the last date M * T ^ 17
 w 1985 
and 
WHEREAS, all applicable statutory provisions of the State of Utah and alt of the provisions of said 
Deed of Trust have been complied with as to acts to be performed and notices to be given, and g 
WHEREAS, Trustee did at the time and place of sale fixed as aforesaid, then and there sell, at public 
auction, to said flranto*, Joseph A. Seethaler and Myra g . / S e S k ? £ f fi& highest bidder therefor, the 
property hereinafter described, for the sum r»f* 10»000»00 paid
 tn cash, lawful money of the United States 
by the satisfaction-P* * port ion of the mH#.hn*w«« then secured by said Deed of Trust 
NOW, THEREFORE, Trustee, in consideration of the premises recited and of the sum a bene mentioned 
bid and paid by Grantee, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and by virtue of the authority vested 
in it by said Deed of Trust, docs, by these presents, GRANT AND CONVEY unto Grantee, but without any 
covenant or warranty, express or implied, all that certain property situate in Utah County 
State of Utah, described as follows 
All of Lot 3, Plat "A", Marjorie Manor Subdivision, Provo, Utaht according 
to the official plat thereof on file in the office of the Recorder, Utah 
County,Utah. 
Re-Recorded to show correct date of sale. 
JO 
K o c 
c 
jmul Abstract 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said SECURITY TITLE COMPANV, as Trustee, has caubed its corporate 
name and seal to be hereto affixed this , 9 th - day of April _. H>_a5_. 
Attest: 
'OA/lto/ 
I; * /STATE, OKUTAKi 
Secretary Glen G. Farrer 
AND ABSTRACT 
ITY TITLE/COMPANY. Trustee 
Hat8oa 
Jz^^Q^s. ^ y 
President 
. day of , Aprils. A.D. 1981 
and Glen G. Farter 
Rex C. Matson 
is the secretary 
\ /^erlSnal^nieared before ™» Rex C. Katson 
\ , Cwjio'JeTnp-.Tte'ine duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said 
*^.t$*'JZr president, and he. the said Glen G. Farrer 
of SECURITY TITLE AjQMPAjfir^&e corporation that executed the foregoing Instrument as such Trustee 
by authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said Re* n. Hi farm 
^> and . ' • f t f f C« Farrer each duly acknowledge to me that said corporation 
/ *V executed' the* same as such Trustee and that the seal affixed Is the seal of said corporation. 






maaarf for tUintltte. 
On* to«| Oanbnr, Suite 100 
».o* mm • 
Proeo, Utah §4103 
> 3 T H I H 6318 
at i w Kutm JUDICIAL DISTRICT QDURT OP tram cowry 
VKnai s. d a m n and MOT* 
T. CMBVDU nuabend and wife, Ufl PBONt 
Civil NO. 64179 
JOEOT A. OBRHAUR and KfW 
I . flETmutft, hueband an! wife 
and aCOHTT THX* JtO ABSHVCT 
NOnai 18 >ODT OWN that an action hen baan uamimul in TlfJ 
Ktma JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF VIM COUNTY, ftTMI OP UBW. by tha 
abam e a v i Plaintiff*. VBK* S. CW8VBI and MUOHA T. OflEVDt, again* 
fen CotadantSe JOSOT A, 6BRHALHI and MTMt * c SHHN&ft, for tho putpoaa 
of having declared void that oectaLt DOB OP TROT, dated tha 10th day of 
Jtt»« 19tl« wherein tha FUlntlffa «n» TKBKV0, and tha DafcnAatta, 
x a o n Ao aamBttai and Mm x. emwizii* «*» BDCPICIMOESI Mid Dead 
of tnut wen reoosded on J i m 11. Xttl, an antry i**ber 1(973 in book 191t 
at pane* fM, Cfl* and 4H of tha Official Mnoacoa of tha Oounty tooordor of 
Ota* OtMtfft t tato of Utah. TW 0B7KT OT tW ACTXOI O Also to . a w declared 
ay fee t a n e of tha ODD OP flUPr (lnnedlataly below tha legal deeeription) 
•jpj tha NBjaMt of TJCMfsr* tha Banaflsiaiy aoraaa to aubordinate thia Dead 
of f t ta* to « l i n t Croat Dead tor a loan m t enaead'ng $44,000 00 • To be 





tUm 044.0OO.Ofl of waltai in tha Mad property or in tha aitamatlva that 
tfcny aay •* any l inn, purauant to aald COD or TROT obtAin A loan fcoa any 
antlty. or inatitution or anyona alaa In tha mount of $44,000.00 ttfilcn 
n a i l alvaya b» auparior to tha tntaraat of tha Banaf IciarlM. TIZ 08JBCT 
OF m ACXTCN n A W to havo daclarad tha dutlaa and lagai rolat Jona of 
tha Plaintiff* and tha Oafandanta with raoarda to tha Mid asm cr TRU&T 
ao that tha Plaintiffa oan datondna thair rlohta anr* duties ttotvunder. 
UK OaJBCT OP IBIS tCTBM IS ALSO to havo tha 0EB> OP TRUST refanwd or 
daclarad void baaad icon, including hut not United to, tha FBMJ) and or 
KSStamsairoaJam of tha aenaficlarlMf tha particuiara of *hich ivfartnoa 
i» and* to tha f i l a in tha afaoua antitlad Court and cauM. Tha proaiam 
affactad by thia auit ara aituatad in tha County of Utah, Stata of Utah, and 
ara daacrtbad aa followa, to witi 
AJl of lot J, Plat "A", IfWOHX m*J* SUBMVISICN, Provo, Utah, 
auoordina to tha aff lc ial plat tharaof on f i la In tho of tic* of tha 
froordar* Utah Oounty, Utah. 
laXOD thia 21th day of fabruary. 'M4. 
lionad for purpoao of Jurat 
L 
yw 3 of Lis tavlra 
STKK or \mn 
ixxtm or UTAH 
tod the lOto. 
before iw KBMETOt r. OAWE the Y 
tcfcnowledqed to m thrt ho exocu
1984, personally appeanad 
within Inatruwnt, Oo duly 
*V oEwiulon <D^>lres . u ;M|»7 
i 
6318 
KENNETH F. CLARKE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
42 North University, Suite 11 
P.O. Box H 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone 801-375-291] 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON S. CHEEVER and 
MARTHA T. CHEEVER, 
husband and wife, AMENDED 
Plaintiffs, L I S PENDENS 
Civil No. 64179 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER and MYRA 
K. SEETHALER, husband and 
Wife, and SECURITY TITLE 
AND ABSTRACT COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that an action has been commenced 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State 
of Utah, by the above named Plaintiffs, Vernon S. Cheever 
and Martha T. Cheever, against the Defendants, Joseph A. 
Seethaler and Myra K. Seethaler, for the purpose of having 
declared void that certain DEED OF TRUST, dated the 10th day 
of June, 1981, wherein the' Plaintiffs are TRUSTORS, and the 
Defendants, Joseph A. Seethaler and Myra K. Seethaler, are 
BENEFICIARIFS; said Deed of Trust was recor^M on June 13, 
1981, as entry number 16973 in book 1918 at pages 696, 697, 
and 698 of the Official Records of the County Recorder of 
Utah County, State of Utah. THE OBJECT OF THE ACTION IS ALSO 
to have declared by the terms of the DEED OF TRUS"* (immediatly 
below the legal description) "At the request of Trustor, the 
3eneficiary agrees to subordinate this Deed of ^rust to a 
First Trust Deed for-' a loan not exceeding £4 4,000.00." To 
be a determination that the TRUSTORS have the secured interest 
themselves of the first $44,000.00 of value in the said pro-
perty or in the alternative tfiat they may at any time, pur-
suant to said DFFD OF TRUST obtain a loan from any entity, 
or institution or anyone else in the amount of £44,000.00 
which shall always be superior to the interest of the Bene-
ficiaries, THF OBJFCT OF THIS ACTION IS ALSO to have de-
clared the duties and legal relations of the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendants with regards to the said DFFD OF TRUST so that 
the Plaintiffs can determine their riqhts and duties there-
under. THE OBJECT OF THIS ACTION IS ALSO to have the DFFD 
OF TRUS^ reformed or declared void based upon, including but 
not limited to, the FRAUD and or MISREPRESENTATIONS of the 
Beneficiaries; the particulars df which reference is made 
to the file in the above entitled Court and Cause, ^he pre-
mises affected by this suit are situated in the County of 
Utah, State of Utah, and are described as follows, to wit: 
All of lot 3, Plat ,fA", MARJORIE MANOR SUBDIVISION, 
Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof 
on file in the office of the Recorder^ U t W County, 
Utah. 
•Summary Judgment was entered against Plaintiffs and 
in Favor of Defendants on the 30th of November, 198*. 
Plaintiffs have appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The 
Case number of the Case on appeal is Supreme Court No. 203^2. 
The case is active and pending. 
*
fIhis paragraph is an amendment to the original IIS PFNTFNS filed 
February 29, 1984 as Instrument #6318, Book 2119, Pago ^ g and 
50, records of Utah County. State of Utah, 
Signed for purpose of Jura 
Signed for purpose of acknowledgement 




My Commission E x p i r e s : NOTARY P U B L I C - ^ UibU^ 
£ J P - > V R e s i d i n g a t : ! r&vO, <*"-«-'<~ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
County of Utah ) 
On the c/ day of April, 1985, personally appeared 
before nv KENNETH F. CLARKE the signer of the within instru-
ment, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
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HIDDEN MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
T. 
Dee MILLS, Milton C. Christenaen. aka 
Milton A. Christenaen, Paradise Valley 
Estates, Inc., Lake Mills Company, a 
Limited Partnership, Carole Lee Chria-
tensen. Environmental Resources, Inc., 
et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
Noa. 15027, 15157. and 15188. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 2, 1979. 
Plaintiff filed action in equity seeking 
specific performance of an option to pur-
chase realty. The Fourth District Court, 
Wasatch County, D. Frank Wilkina, J., dis-
missed action and plaintiff appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Ellett. J., 29 Utah 2d 469, 
511 P.2d 737, reversed and directed grant-
ing of specific performance. On remand, 
the trial court ordered defendant to trans-
fer property to plaintiff. When plaintiff 
was unable to enforce judgment against 
defendant due to interim conveyances, 
pUinliff tiled aupplementai complaint and 
joined as additional party defendants those 
persons who acquired interests in subject 
land subsequent to entry of initial judg-
ment of trial court The Fourth District 
Court, Wasatch County, Ernest F. Baldwin, 
J., entered judgment of specific perform-
ance in favor of plaintiff, subject to defend-
ant's entitlement to compensation (or im-
provement made as an occupying claimant, 
and defendants appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) lis pendens 
continued U> be effective after judgment 
and pending appeal, and thus defendants 
were thereby charged with constructive no-
tice of plaintiff's claims prior to their acqui-
sition of any interests in land; (2) record 
also supported trial court's conclusion that 
defendants had actual notice of plaintiffs 
appeal; (3) trial court's determination, in 
proceeding following remand, ordering spe-
cific performance was res judicata as to 
amount payable by plaintiff under option to 
defendant, and defendant could not now 
attempt to alter that determination so as to 
recover value of improvements made as oc-
cupying claimant after date of plaintiff's 
option, and (4) occupying claimant having 
made no showing that it acted in good faith 
in making improvements on subject proper-
ty, it was not entitled to compensation for 
said improvements. 
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated 
in part. 
Crockett, J., concurred but dissented in 
part and filed opinion. 
1. Lis Pendens *=»11(2) 
Lis pendens continued to be effective 
after judgment and pending appeal. U.C. 
A. 1953, 78 40 2. 
2. Us Pendens *=•! 
Term "lis pendens" signifies pending 
litigation and so-called "doctrine of lis pen-
dens" confirms power of courts over proper-
ty during pendency of legal proceedings. 
U.C.A.1953, 78 40-2. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Lla Pendens *»22(1) 
Lis pendens charges public with notice 
of outstanding claims and causes one who 
deals with property involved in pending liti-
gation to do so at his peril. U.C.A.1953, 
78^40^2. 
4. Lis Pendens *=»1 
Sole purpose of recording a lis pendens 
is to give constructive notice of pendency of 
proceedings which may be derogatory to an 
owner's title or right to possession. U.C.A. 
1953, 7a 40 2. 
6. Us Pendens «=»22(2) 
One who takes with full knowledge 
that property taken is subject of ongoing 
litigation acquires only grantor's interest 
therein, subject to whatever disposition 
court might make of it. 
6. Appeal and Error •=•1197 
Where a judgment is reversed and re-
manded with specific instruction or di-
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rections, case stands in lower court precisely 
as it did before a trial was had in the first 
instance. 
7. U s Pendens *=»11(2) 
Fact that plaintiff failed to furnish a 
supersedeas bond after filing an appeal 
from trial court's dismissal ot its action tor 
specific performance of an option to pur-
chase realty did not render notice given by 
previously recorded lis pendens ineffectual. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2; Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 73(d). 
8. Records *=»19 
Those who deal in real property inter-
ests are bound by those matters that appear 
of record and one may not be penalized or 
deprived of effectiveness of such notice aa 
is imparted by record simply because of 
some unrelated action or inaction of his or 
others. 
t . Appeal and Error *~458(1) 
Plaintiff, which appealed trial court's 
dismissal of its action for specific perform-
ance of an option to purchase realty, was 
not bound to furnish supersedeas; such was 
merely available to him. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 73(d). 
19. Appeal and Error *»485(1) 
Purpose and effect of supersedeas is to 
restrain successful party and lower court 
from taking affirmative action to enforce a 
judgment or decree. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 73(d). 
11. U s Pendens *~11(2) 
Since lis pendens filed in connection 
with suit tor specific performance of an 
option to purchase realty was still effective 
after judgment and pending appeal, parties 
which subsequently acquired interest in 
subject land subsequent to entry ot initial 
judgment of trial court were thereby 
charged with constructive notice ot plain-
tiff's claim prior to their acquisition of any 
interest in land. U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2. 
12. Appeal and Error «=»I214 
Record supported trial court's conclu-
sion, on supplemental complaint following 
remand, that defendants had actual knowl-
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edge of plaintiff's appeal from trial court's 
original dismissal ot its action for specific 
performance of an option to purchase realty 
and hence defendants, which acquired inter-
ests in subject (and subsequent to entry ot 
initial judgment of trial court, were 
charged with knowledge of fact that first 
judgment was subject to being reversed. 
13. Judgment «=» 586(2) 
Trial court's determination, in proceed-
ing following remand, ordering specific per-
formance of option to purchase realty in 
favor of plaintiff was res judicata as to 
amount payable by plaintiff under option to 
defendant, and defendant could not subse-
quently attempt to alter that determination 
so as to recover value of improvements 
made as occupying claimant after date of 
plaintiffs option. U.C.A.1953, 67 6 1 et 
seq. 
14. Improvements «=»3 
"Occupying Claimants" statute amelio-
rates strict common-law rule that owner is 
entitled to improvements placed by another 
upon his property, and is baaed upon equita-
ble doctrine of unjust enrichment U.C.A. 
1953, 67 -* - ! et aeq., 57-6-2. 
15. Improvements *=»4(1) 
An occupying claimant is required by 
statute to establish two elements before he 
can recover for improvements placed on 
real property by him: (1) that he has color 
of title; and (2) that he placed improve-
ments in good faith; if he fails to establish 
either one, he cannot recover. U.C.A.1953, 
67-6k 1 et seq. 
16. Appeal and Error •=» 1008.1(3) 
Rules of appellate review generally 
preclude the Supreme Court from substitut-
ing its judgment for that of trial court on 
factual issues. 
17. Trial «-388(1) 
Trial court is bound to make factual 
determinations to support its legal conclu-
sions and said findings must be supported 
by substantial evidence. 
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18. Improvement* *=»4(2) 
Occupying claimant having made no 
showing that it acted in good faith in mak-
ing improvements on subject property, it 
was not entitled to compensation for said 
improvement*. U.C.A.1953, 57-6-1 et seq. 
19. Improvement* *=»4(2) 
One who relies upon rights afforded by 
statute as an occupying claimant is charged 
with burden of demonstrating his good 
faith in placing improvements in face of an 
adverse claim. U.C.A.1953, 67-6-1 et seq. 
20. Improvements *=»4(2) 
Occupying claimant's reliance on accu-
racy of trial court's initial ruling dismissing 
action for specific performance of an option 
to purchase alty was not sufficient to 
justify a dele mination of good faith on 
part of occupy,ng claimant in placing im-
provements in face of an adverse claim on 
subject property. U.C.A 1953, 57-6-1 et 
seq. 
John G. Marshall. Salt Lake City, for Dee 
Mills, Evelyn I. Mills, and Evelyn Mills 
Trust. 
Hanson & Garrett, Salt Lake City, for 
Intern. Environ. Sciences. 
Leonard H Eusscn and James L Sadler. 
Salt Lake City, for Milton Christensen, Par-
adise Valley Estates, Lake Mills, Carole 
Christensen and Environmental Resources. 
Cullen Y. Christensen, Provo, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
This is an action in equity seeking specific 
performance of an option to purchase real-
ty 
Defendants, Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills 
(hereinafter "Mills"), granted the option in 
question in favor of plaintiff's predecessor 
in interest. Sultscquently, Mills granted a 
similar option to defendant, Milton C. Chris-
tensen (hereinafter "Christensen"). Mills 
I. Hidden Meadowa Development Company v 
refused to honor plaintiffs option which 
resulted in the filing of the initial complaint 
and the recording of a Lis Pendens in the 
office of the county recorder. Thereafter, 
Mills conveyed various interests in the land 
in question to defendants, Paradise Valley 
Estates, Inc., (hereinafter "Paradise") Lake 
Hills Company, a limited partnership, (here-
inafter "Lake") Carole Lee Davis, Environ-
mental Resources, Inc., and International 
Environmental Sciences, a limited partner-
ship (hereinafter "International"). Those 
conveyances were apparently with the con-
sent of Christensen as he was president of 
Paradise, the principal of Lake and became 
the husband of Carole Lee Davis (a partner 
in International). 
The initial trial of the specific perform-
ance action resulted in a judgment of dis-
missal declaring the option void and an 
appeal was filed to this Court. Supersedeas 
bond was fixed in the sum of $50,000, how-
ever, none was ever furnished. This Court 
reversed and directed the granting of spe-
cific performance of the option.1 On re-
mand, the trial court on August 28, 1973 
ordered Mills to transfer the property to 
plaintiff for the sum of $86,200. In the 
interim between the entry of the initial 
judgment and the order of August 28, 1973, 
Lake and Paradise conveyed the land in 
question to defendant, international, which 
proceeded to make certain improvements on 
the land and also made certain conveyances 
of various portions thereof. When plaintiff 
was unable to enforce the judgment against 
Mills due to the interim conveyances, it 
filed a supplemental complaint and joined 
as additional parties defendant those per-
sons who had acquired any interest in the 
subject land subsequent to the entry of the 
initial judgment of the trial court 
After a trial on the issues raised by the 
supplemental complaint, the trial court spe-
cifically found that all defendants had actu-
al knowledge of the appeal pending in this 
Court prior to their acquisition of any pur-
ported interest in the land and, since the Lis 
Mill$. et at, 29 Utah 2d 469. 511 P 2d 737 (1973) 
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Pendens remained unreleased, they had 
constructive notice of plaintiff's interest as 
well. The trial court further found that 
International had made improvements upon 
the land consisting of land leveling and 
clearing, installation of culverts, grading of 
roads, installation of ditches and remodeling 
and addition to a house situated thereon, all 
of which had a value of $35,000. The trial 
court also found that International had un-
dertaken certain planning, platting and re-
zoning activities with respect to the use of 
the land, hut declined to place any value 
thereon as an improvement. Accordingly, 
judgment of specific performance was en-
tered in favor of plaintiff, subject to Inter-
national's entitlement to compensation in 
the amount of $35,000 for improvement 
made as an occupying claimant* 
Mills, Christensen and International filed 
separate appeals which have been previous-
ly consolidated.' The basic Issue raised by 
each appeal bears upon the propriety of the 
trial court's determination that the recorda-
tion of a Lis Pendens precludes the convey-
ance of a marketable title to lands that are 
the subject of a pending appeal. Both In-
ternational and Mills raise additional issues 
which hear u|>on their res|>ective positions 
as occupying claimants, the former contend-
ing it is entitled to a further award for 
expenditures attributable to its efforts to 
rczone the land, and the latter contending 
that the trial court erred in refusing to 
receive proffered evidence of improvement 
they made to the land. 
Plaintiff cross-appeals, challenging the 
award to International as an occupying 
claimant on the ground that the improve-
ments were not made in good faith 
(1) First addressing the Lis Pendens is-
sue, we note that appellants simply urge 
that Lis Pendens has no effect or duration 
after judgment and pending appeal. A re-
view of the basic doctrine of Lis Pendens, 
2. Pursuant to U C A . 1953. 57 6 I. et seq 
3. Various other named defendantV Interests 
were previously compromised and settled so as 
to obviate their appeal Also, the appeal of 
Paradise, take. Carole tee Christensen (for-
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our statutory enactment pertaining thereto, 
and the prior pronouncements of this Court, 
fail to sustain their contentions. 
[2,3) Literally, the term "lis pendens" 
signifies pending litigation and the so-called 
"doctrine of lis pendens" confirms the pow-
er of the courts over property during the 
pendency of legal proceedings. It charges 
the public with notice of outstanding claims 
and causes one who deals with property 
involved in pending litigation to do so at his 
peril.4 
U.C.A., 1953, 78-40 2 provides as follows: 
78-40-2. Lis pendens.—In any action 
effecting the title to, or the right of 
possession of, real property the plaintiff 
at the time of filing the complaint or 
thereafter, and the defendant at the time 
of filing his answer when affirmative re-
lief is claimed in such answer, or at any 
time afterward, may file for record with 
the recorder of the county in which the 
property or some part thereof is situated 
a notice of the pendency of the action, 
containing the names of the parties, the 
object of the action or defense, and a 
description of the property in that county 
affected thereby. From the time of fil-
ing such notice for record only shall a 
purchaser encumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have con-
structive notice of th* pendency of the 
action, and only of its pendency against 
parties designated by their real names. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The fact that the foregoing statutory 
provision allows the recordation of a Lis 
Pendens at any time clearly preserves its 
integrity after judgment and pending ap-
peal. 
Consistent with said statutory provision, 
this Court long ago recognized the on-going 
potency and effectiveness of a recorded lis 
pendens after judgment. In Larsen v. Gaa-
merly Carole tee Oavls), and Environmental 
Resources will hereafter be referred to that of 
"Christensen" for the purposes of convenience 
since the Issues raised are Identical 
4. See 51 Am Jur 2d tla Pendent. Sec I 
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beq?* it was held that where real property 
was levied upon under an execution as the 
property of the judgment debtor, the filing 
of a lis pendens notice of a suit by the 
grantor of the judgment debtor one day 
before the execution sale imparted notice to 
the purchaser at such execution sale of all 
plaintiffs right, title and interest Conse 
quently the deed executed under such cir 
cumstanoes was held to be null and void and 
was cancelled for want of a bona fide or 
innocent purchaser 
• (4, 5] The sole purpose of recording a lis 
pendens is to give constructive notice of the 
pendency of proceedings which may be de-
rogatory to an owners title or right to 
possession* One who takes with full 
knowledge that the property taken is the 
subject of on going litigation acquires only 
the grantor s interest therein subject to 
whatever disposition the court might make 
of i t ' 
[6] The rule is well settled that, where a 
judgment is reversed and remanded with 
specific instruction or directions, the case 
stands in the lower court precisely as it did 
before a trial was had in the first instance • 
Hence, that very situation existed in the 
instant cane as a result of our reversal and 
remand with directions to grant specific 
performance* Also by so reversing the 
Court has already recognized the full effec 
tiveness of lis pendens pending appeal 
|7—10] Appellants further contend that 
since plaintiff failed to furnish aSupersede 
as bond it was not entitled to a stay of 
proceedings and that such failure in some 
way rendered the notice given by the re 
corded lis pendens ineffectual For two 
very obvious reasons, that contention is 
without merit First and foremost the 
I 43 UUh 203 134 P 885 (1913) 
• Hansen v Kohler Utah 550 P 2d 186 (1976) 
7 Glynn v Dubln 13 Utah 2d 163 369 P 2d 910 
(1962) 
• Larsen v Gasberg supra footnote 5 
9 Hidden Meadows Development Company v 
Mills supra footnote I 
"failure" to accomplish any number of im 
aginable things in no way alters the ines-
capable fact that a duly recorded lis pen 
dens serves as notice to all persons It is an 
elementary principle of real estate law that 
those who deal in property interests are 
bound by those matters that appear of rec 
ord and one may not be penalized or de-
prived of the effectiveness of such notice as 
is imparted by the record simply because of 
some unrelated action or inaction of his or 
others Secondly, plaintiff was not bound 
to furnish su|>ersedea8 Such was merely 
available to him •• The fact that none was 
furnished is of no consequence in this case 
This is found to be so when it is observed 
that the purpose and effect of supersedeas 
is to restrain the successful party and the 
lower court from taking affirmative action 
to enforce a judgment or decree11 The 
judgment involved here was one of dismiss-
al and, as such, was self-executing Hence, 
it was not the subject of any enforcement 
and the failure to perfect supersedeas could 
in no way affect i t u 
[11] In light of the foregoing analysis, it 
cannot be said that a lis pendens does not 
endure after judgment and pending appeal, 
and we so hold Consequently, the trial 
court correctly determined that all appcl 
lants were thereby charged with construc-
tive notice of plaintiff's claims prior to their 
acquisition of any interests in the land in 
question 
[12] The propriety of the trial court's 
conclusion that appellants had actual notice 
of plaintiffs appeal is also borne out by the 
record which reflects the fact that at all 
times material to these proceedings, Chris 
tensen was intertwined with all of the ap-
pellants and was the apparent alter ego of 
certain of them He was president of Para 
19 Rule 73(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
11 4 Am Jur 2d Appeal and Error Section 371 
12 Gumherts v East Oak Street Hotel Co 404 
III 386 88 N E 2d 883 (l<H9) Western United 
Dairy Co v Miller 40 IIIApp2d 403 189 
N E 2d 786 (1963) 
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dise and Environmental Resources, Inc 
which was the general partner of Environ-
mental, a limited partnership, and he mar-
ried Carole Lee Davis on February 16, 1973 
Those facts are sufficient to support the 
trial court's conclusion that the appellants 
had actual knowledge of plaintiff's appeal 
and hence were charged with knowledge of 
the fact that the first judgment was subject 
to being reversed u 
[13] Turning now to the issue presented 
by the appeal of Mills which hears upon 
their entitlement to the value of improve-
ments made as occupying claimants after 
the date of plaintiff's option to purchase, it 
appears that their contentions are without 
substance This is so by reason of the fact 
that these matters were before the trial 
court in the proceeding conducted following 
our earlier remand In that proceeding, 
plaintiff and Mills were both parties, the 
same property was involved, and the 
amount to be paid by plaintiff to Mills to 
acquire the property was determined No 
appeal was taken from the order of Specific 
Performance of August 28 1973 Such pri-
or determination is res judicata as to the 
amount payable by the plaintiff under the 
option to Mills, who cannot now attempt to 
alter that former decision ,4 
The final iseut requiring our attention 
involves the appeal of International which 
seeks to enhance its award for improve 
ments as occupying claimant and the cross 
appeal of plaintiff which asserts the trial 
court erred in making any award at all for 
improvements 
The Legislature has seen fit to temper 
the rigid rules of the common law by enact 
ing an "Occupying Claimants' statuteM 
which provides in pertinent part as follows 
57-6 1 Where an occupant of real 
estate has color of title thereto and in 
IS McClung v Hohl 10 Kan App 93 61 P 507 
(1900) Patterson v Old Dominion Trust Co 
844 Va 597 140 S E 810 (1927) Glynn v 
Dubin supra footnote 7 
14 Matthews v Matthews 102 Utah 428 132 
P2d III (1942) 
15 U C A 19*53 57 ^ I et seq 
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good faith has made valuable improve-
ments thereon, and is afterwards in a 
proper action found not to be the owner, 
no execution shall issue to put the plain-
tiff in possession of the same after the 
filing of a complaint as hereinafter pro-
vided, until the provisions of this chapter 
have been complied with [Emphasis 
added] 
67-6- 2 Such complaint must set forth 
the grounds on which the defendant seeks 
relief, stating as accurately as practicable 
the value of the real estate, exclusive of 
the improvements thereon made by the 
claimant or his grantors, and the value of 
such improvements The issues joined 
thereon must be tried as in law actions, 
and the value of the real estate and of 
such improvements must be separately 
ascertained on the trial 
[14] The fortgoiag sections ameliorate 
the strict common law rule that the owner 
is entitled to the improvements placed by 
another upon his property, and is based 
upon the equitable doctrine of unjust en-
richment '• 
[15] An occupying claimant is required 
by our statute to establish two elements 
before he can recover for improvements 
placed on real property by him (1) that he 
has color of title, and (2) that he placed the 
improvements in good faith If he fails to 
establish either one, he cannot rawer " 
A number of jurisdictions including 
Utah, have announced the broad proposition 
that no recovery can be had for improve-
menU made with the knowledge of the 
existence of an adverse claim which subse-
quently proves to be superior to that of the 
occupant11 The eases of Reimann v 
If Reimann v Baum 115 UUh 147 203 P2d 
387 (1949) 
17 Doyle v West Temple Terrace Co 47 Utah 
238 152 P 1180(1915) Day v Jones 112 Utah 
286 187 P2d 181 (1947) 
IS See 41 Am Jur 2d Improvements Section 17 
for citations 
SSOH4—27 
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Baumw and Erickson v. Stokesm both 
stand for the proposition that one who 
places improvements after notice of an ad-
verse claim is precluded from recovering 
the value thereof. 
The facta in Erickson v. Stokes are strik-
ingly similar to those in the case before us. 
There, Erickson, a purchaser at tax sale, 
sued to quiet title and obtained a judgment. 
Thereafter Stokes sought to intervene and 
moved to «t aside the decree and re-open 
the case, s< >ting forth by affidavit that she 
had a substantial interest in the property 
and a good defense to the action Her 
application for intervention was denied and 
she then sued Erickson to quiet title, re-
cording a lis pendens. She was ultimately 
successful in her suit, having shown the tax 
sale was defective. After the filing of her 
quiet title action and during its pendency, 
Erickson proceeded to construct improve-
ments The court in denying Erickson'a 
claim for the value of the improvements 
observed that he had notice of the adverse 
claim prior to the placement of the im-
provements and in the absence of a showing 
of good faith, (which burden was upon him) 
he could not recover. 
{IS, 17) The rules of appellate review 
generally preclude this Court from substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the trial 
court on factual issues. However, the trial 
court is bound to make factual determina-
tions in support its legal conclusions and 
said findings must be supported by substan-
tial evidence. 
118) A review of the record in this mat-
ter reveals that International made no 
showing that it acted in good faith in mak-
ing the improvements and the court's find-
ings of fact are entirely silent in that re-
gard, leaving nothing to support its conclu-
sion of law that International was entitled 
to an award of $35,000. 
It is also to be noted that the conclusion 
of the trial court that International had 
actus/ and constructive notice of plaintiffs 
It. Supra, footnote 16 
claims is wholly inconsistent with the con-
cept of good faith on the part of Interna-
tional. 
(19) As was noted supra, the doctrine of 
lis pendens imposes upon one who deals in 
property, which is the subject of pending 
litigation, the burden of doing so at his 
peril. Consequently, one who relics upon 
the rights afforded by statute as an occupy-
ing claimant is charged with the burden of 
demonstrating his good faith in placing im-
provements in the face of an adverse claim. 
(20) International's sole explanation of 
good faith was that it relied on the accura-
cy of the ruling in the first trial under the 
facts of this case Such is not sufficient to 
justify a determination of good faith 
The judgment is affirmed except that 
portion thereof which awards $35,000 to 
International as an occupying claimant is 
vacated. Plaintiff is entitled to costs. 
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and 
W1LKINS. JJ . concur. 
CROCKETT, Justice: (Concurring, but 
dissenting in part) 
I agree with all that is said in the main 
opinion, except that I dissent from those 
portions dealing with the reversal of the 
award of $35,000 to the defendant as an 
occupying claimant. That reversal appears 
to be based upon the statement that "no 
recovery can be had for improvements 
made with ihe knowledge uf the existence 
of an adverse claim which subsequently 
proves to be su|>erior to that of the occu-
pant." That statement is too broad. If 
literally applied, it would in many instances 
defeat the purpose of the occupying claim-
ant statute. It is submitted that an exami-
nation of the cases cited in support thereof' 
will reveal that the rule as stated is all 
right as applicable to the particular facts 
therein, but is not necessarily inconsistent 
with what is said in this dissent. 
It requires little reflection to realize that 
if a claimant must have title which ulti-
I. See footnote 18 main opinion 
2t. 120 Utah 653. 237 P 2d 1012 (1951) 
CHRISTIANSEN v. UTAH-IDAHO SUGAR CO. 
CtUMSMr.24 1281 
Utah 1251 
mately proves to be superior, he would have 
no need to recover for improvements placed 
on the land. It is only when he has a bona 
fide claim, constituting color of title, and in 
good faith places improvements on the land, 
and bis claim of title later proves to be 
inferior to some other claim, that he needs 
that protection. 
Consistent with the foregoing is the lan-
guage of the statutes themselves. Sees. 
57-6-1 and 2 indicate that the occupant can 
recover if "in good faith" he makes valua-
ble improvements on the property and is 
afterwards "found not to be the owner." It 
is obvious that this contemplates a situation 
where there is an outstanding "adverse 
claim which subsequently proves to be supe-
rior to that of the occupant." 
The main opinion correctly states that the 
doctrine is based on unjust enrichment of 
the person who proves to be the true owner. 
This enrichment entails something which is 
a benefit to the land and thus to the true 
owner. 
Whether recovery may be had may well 
depend upon several circumstances, includ-
ing the nature of the improvement placed 
on the property. Conceivably it could be a 
dam, or a bridge or some other improve-
ment essential to preserve the land itself, as 
contrasted with something which would im-
prove it only for the pur|>ose and use of the 
occupying claimant. In this case the view 
of the trial c«urt WM that the leveling and 
clearing of the land, installation of ditches 
and culverts, grading of roads and remodel-
ing of the house were such improvements of 
the land itself as to constitute an unjust 
enrichment to the plaintiff. 
The critical questions for determination 
in this case: whether the defendant as an 
occupying claimant placed the improve-
ments thereon in good faith, and whether 
they unjustly enriched the plaintiff by im-
proving his land, are necessarily questions 
of fact the determination of which should 
be left to the trial court. This is affirmed 
by Sec. 57 6 2 which states that "the issues 
joined thereon must be tried as in law ac-
tions ." 
Inasmuch as those critical issues have 
been tried and determined by the trial 
court, and there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence to support his finding and judg-
ment, it is my opinion that under the stan-
dard rule of review they should not be 
overturned. 
I would affirm the judgment in its entire-
ty. 
T. Val CHRISTIANSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH-IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY, • cor-
poratlon, and Union Pacific Railroad, a 
corporation, Defendant* and Respon-
dents). 
No. 15751. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 24, 1979. 
Grantee brought suit for damages for 
alleged breach of covenants under special 
warranty deed. The Fourth District "Court, 
Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J., entered 
summary judgment in favor of grantor, ami 
grantee appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Hall, J., held that summary judgment in 
favor of grantor was precluded by existence 
of factual issues concerning when grantee 
received notice of existence of encumbrance 
and whether grantee was ever evicted from 
property. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Covenants *=»110 
Cause of action for a breach of certain 
implied covenants in warranty deed remains 
viable for six years. U.CA.1953, 78 12-
23(2). 
KENNETH F. CLARKE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Atttorney for Plaintiff 
42 North University Ave, Suite 11 
P.O. Box H 
P r o v o , Utah 84603 
T e l e p h o n e 8 0 1 - 3 7 5 - 2 9 1 1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON S. CHEEVER, MARTHA 
T. CHEEVER, UTAH COUNTY 
PACKING COMPANY, INC. , and 
COLES BROTHERS, I N C . , STIPULATION 
P l a i n t i f f s - A p p e l l a n t s , 
v s
* C i v i l No . 2 0 , 3 6 2 
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, MYRA 
K. SEETHALER, and SECURITY 
TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
/ 
WHEREAS, the Appellant filed a MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PAGE IN 
BRIEF AND FILE EXHIBIT 7, dated the 12th day of April, 1985 and the 
same has not yet been scheduled for hearing; 
AND WHEREAS, Appellant having filed a MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES, dated the 12th day of April, 1985 in support of 
SUBSTITUTING PAGE 2 6 OF BRIEF, a copy of which is attached hereto; 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS AGREED, that hearing on the same need not 
be had at this time and that the Appellant may incorporate the mat-
ters heretofore set forth into its REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS and 
that tb«» Respondents, may have the option of replying to the same 
if they file a Response to REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS. That oral 
arguement on the same may be had at the time of Oral Argument in the 
above entitled case, 
DATED this £ day of M$y, 1985. 
ETH F. ObARKE 
Attorney for Appellant 
D LAMDE-RT ' PAVII 
Attorney for Respondent 
-2- STIPULATION 
VERNON CHEEVER, Exhibit 9, PR 760, Paragraph 2; Affidavit of 
MARTHA T. CHEEVER, Exhibit 18; Affidavit of BRUCE COLES, Exhibit 
19. 
Appellants Third Cause of Action, is also viable; the trier 
of the facts may determine that there is no contract. 
Appellants Fourth Cause of Action, is equitable in nature 
and should be sustained. So also as to Appellants FIFTH CAUSE 
OF ACTION. 
CONCLUSION AMD PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Court should rule that SUMMAPY JUDGMENT, was improperly 
granted, and the judgment of Lower Court reversed with all 
causes of action in place and that tho Lower Court should ser-
iously look to determining if the prevailing party should be 
awarded Attorney Fees pursuant to Section 78-27-56 of the Utah 
Code. 
That in the event the Appellants are successful on Appeal, 
That Plaintiffs be allowed to file a Cause of Action for damages 
for the loss of the use of their property and for quieting Title 
to the Property in Plaintiffs by allov/ing amendments to Plaintiffs 
pleadings. 
RESPECTFULLY^ SUBMITTED*, 
KENNETH p . ClJVF^KE 
/ 
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per And Heed to enter Into a contract with 
Jungk and l-ahfan for a Jim:* number nt »liwp, 
for future deliver/, but concealed from them, 
a* they claim, that be wan himself Interested 
In thi» pun hate, or that he was a partner wltb 
Jungk and Fabian. Se-ott represented to Crop-
per and Heed Lii.it Jie t-ould conltact with Jungk 
ami Talilan at a price much larger than they 
could be purchased for. He flunlly proposed a 
partnet ship with Ctopper and lW\t\ to furulsh 
the sheep to Jungk and I'ablau The con 
tract waa to be In their name, and be waa to ba 
a silent partner. and Interested In tbe profits. 
He waa to pun base the sheep at a rale that 
would make a profit, and advised them where 
he could Ret the sheep Under those Induce-
ments Cropper and He* d entered utto tin agree-
ment Willi Jungk and Fabian licciuiltcr 24, 
1*<ku by with h tbey were to di liver lu July, 
ISlki to Jungk and I abliui frfKl sin ep at a cer-
tain price, Jn certain places In Southern Utah 
In February, ISInl n not her similar contract 
was made under similar < In iiinshinccs Scott 
waa Interested as a partner on iNdh sides. 
Clrop|»er *nd l(oi>d clsliti that they did not know 
tbat be *us lutciested with Jungk and Fabian. 
On the i gnlng of (be contriicts, 15.000 was nd j 
vaneed t y Jungk aud Fnblan on each contrail, 
and Cropper and Heed were reiiulred to give j 
sureties for due perform nice on their pirt 
Uolbrook and Dnggtus weie offere<I as such 
sureties, and, being accepted. Jungk nud Fa 
Man directed S«-ott to go with C>op|»cr and 
Heed to Provo. ns their represents the and get , 
Uolbrook and Dugglna to sign the guaiantlea j 
AH these parties went to Proto, soil* Ifed and 
ohtaloed llolbntok nud tluggtus as sureties for 
Oiopptr and Heed. Siott biking mi nctlve part 
in the conversation and In bringing a tout the 
result but bis Inlet est In toth sides of the cim 
tra<t WHS not divulged to the nun-lies fled 
linwk sud Duggins weie ol<l accpniiulauces of 
Cropper and Heed Bcott was a slntugtr \ 
The partnership contract between Scott and 
Cropper and Heed, of Noviinhcr, 1SS0, w.ia not J 
placed In writing until Mm eh 7, I8JHJ ft rends 
as follows "'I bis sKieeiiient nmde nud enteted 
ttitn by and between Ciop|»er, Heed, nn I Scott, 
• a partners dealing In est lie, abet p. and n n ! 
estate; tbey each one ngtee with eat b other 
to buy ami sell on COUIIIIIKHIOII, nud share equal 
ly In profits and los* on all real entitle nnd tat-
tle and ex(HU>c* of bundling the twine; to 
alia re In two coiitiiuls t>f (-hup nuide by Ciop-
per ami Heed to lungk ami I abdn The paid 
Bcott is to duldo all profits made in atlltu,;, 
ami the said Cropper aud Heed IM to divide all 
prollls ma do In biljlug, should there be any, 
ami to woik to one another's Interest In the 
entire bu»lm ss as iiartmrs Crop|ier and 
Heed B \ \ Scolt" Jungk and I abhn hud 
ID the meantime mnile a con ti net to full sheep, 
rrhlng on their con I r net with Scott, but the I 
mat l e t price had rist n a t o t e the eoulrnct price I 
Scott failed lu |>erf»riuiiia; his ngic-cmcnt nllh j 
Cropper and Heed, ami the* with Jungk and I 
I iil>'in (t»H»>i'ii| \ t | i i <• i.ttitt t'luppei n u l l 
It. vd ami Jungk ami Fabian met at l>e*ciel | 
I in July, 1800 In the absence of Ilolbtook «n„ 
| Dugglna and Scott: ami It was agreed
 n* 
Cropiier and ltet<«l shoultl pay ba< k the $»oooo 
adtnnced, ami $r».o*K) as damages for breach ^ 
mntratt This auui waa paid baik elCeJJ 
about $8.<m. Junjrk and Fabian then w»J 
I to Provo. and presented Uieir claim to U^ 
brook aud DuuRlna, but no disclosure was
 w 
any time made to tlictii of Scott's particle 
tlon on both sides of the contract. I b U fac( 
was concealed from Uie studies . It
 w > | 
agreed that Cropper and Heed should make n,e 
three notes for f7.000. aud that Uolbrook «nii 
Ihigxlns should ludorse them aa they bad l^ 
dorsed tbe contract, in contluuaUon. and ^ 
pursuance of their liability aa sureties. Xbe 
notes were made and Indorsed, and are the 
notes in su i t Cropper tc-tlncd that be knew 
or suspected, tiefore the notes were gl icn, i^ 
Bcott waa Interested with Junsk aud FnbUm. 
Icsllinony was offered tending to HIIOW that 
Fnblnu bad notice of Scott a duplli Ity with hit 
firm, and allegetl secret dealings with Juugk, 
his partner, lu .fuiy 'lestlntouy naa also of 
fered tending to show tbat J tingle ami Fublso, 
[ or one of them, knew that ("topper, Heed, and 
Scott owned sheep that were at Oasis lu I88tj 
or 181)1, when Fnhlnn was there, before ti* 
notes were glren; that Cropiier aud lle»d also 
knew Hint Siott waa buying hheep for Jungk 
and Fabian; and Hint Scott at t< d as agt ut for 
Junsk and l<ablnn In proi urlng the alguntiirei 
i of Uolbrook and Uugglns. as their sureties oa 
| the sheep eoulrnct Stott's name does not ap^  
pear on either of tbe uotea or contract, except 
that Scott tudorsed a note of Cropper nnd Reed 
j for H.&00, given In settlement, also a $G00 aote, 
i given In settlement, with h plaintiffs regarded 
j as equal to Scott'a pmtlt lu the sheep dtllr 
cretl in tbe early port of the contiatt These 
noles rornied part of the consideration paid 
I pin In I Iff 8 at tbe time of the settlement, ouMJi 
I of the notes In suit When tbe tlnee uott a feQ 
due, deftudants Uolbrook nnd Dugglns ItaiuetJ 
for tbe first time that Scott was a partner 
with both Crup|>er and Hoed and Jungk anil 
Fabian, and Hint he was lntcrcst<>d in the con 
tract, to Uieir detrlmcut, ami leftistd pa)merit 
A trial wan had. and Ju.lgm. ut rendered ng dost 
Cropper ami Heed ou a former bearing Plain-
tiffs appeal. 
The cnuit refti*<d to Instruct tbe Juty to rea-
der a verdict lu favor of plaintiffs but Instruct 
ed Hie Jury In effect Hint If tbe tlefi udants knew 
Hint Jungk. Fabian, aud Scott were partners 
nnd that Cmpper, Heed, anil Siott were part 
in rs B In n tin j Kigncd the note, they would bt 
iMiitnd. and t int the burden to show that the; 
did not know It waa upon defendants, tbnt if 
the Jury found Hint, at tbe time the conlmctr 
were guarantied by defendants. 8«ott was In 
terested on tmtb allies of the contract, aud aT»» 
• partner of Jungk and Fslilnn for the pun"** 
of buying aheep, and ot Cmpper and Hied for 
the puri>oae of delivering ahtep to Jungk a*1 
Fabian, aud thai defenduuts were Iguotaiit of 
siith rein (Ions when Hnj signed the coiilrid 
and nolea, ami Uiat Jungk and Fabian, or & 
Ut»b> 
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 0f thern, knew al the time of KU«II sign-
''** by defendants as s m e t b s for Ctop|»er iiml 
'ued tbat Bcott was a pat tin r, mid htteiesfisl 
Ith Cropper and Heetl In lbe two HIKH p tsui 
* t* and that they (oiieealetl sin li fact fiom 
'he' * fcndaiilH, tbe Jur> sliotilil (lint for de 
Irtiilnntit; 
, parbici 
that S ' o t l s kiiowbtlge Hint be was 
>r In Ixdh piuUictshlps for Uie piii|Htses 
- - |" iroidd not be kuowl<s|gt> of or notice to 
iaiigfc I U H | Fahi'"t> l , M , t t H ' ' >"Hmletlge of 
L , « rould not be Imputed to Jungk ami Fu-
ji
 n timt If Jungk ami Fnblnu, or ell Iter of 
hpin. knew or bad iiollte lM>ft»te defendants 
\fin«'l *•"* < > o l ,tr ,"t of Sc«»tt s InlereHt wllb 
rmi>lM r '"" , , , , M N | , n "" , H,M *•'•' c o , l l t , a ' , B , 4 v , m 
tliclrdul) to Infoi m tbe defend'iiits of the same, 
nti their m glint to do so would lie a fin ml ou 
"iiftndnnts and In that ensc defendants would 
not IK* 1 , n , , M niiU'<" t h r . v h , , , ' w o f s , , o t t H •"* 
nn'«t ' r o , , B W H M P "" , ' r MMiiee; that imlbe doi§ 
pot mean actual and dliect Infoi unit Ion If a 
ptirty I" l»«»t "l»«» lut|u»ry aa lo a pmtitular 
fmt Ihen he Is dunged 'n Inw ul lh whatever 
Inquiry nlll dls< h>s<' 'J be lourt gave othei Itt-
ulriK Hons with refereme to the noles Is'litg in 
(Mtittlntiatlou of (he contract of gu iraut ) ; that 
If, liefore the <v7idi«cls were fulfilled one pint 
ner of Jungk and Fabian entere<l Into o part 
nershlp with R<«ed ami Cropi»er. and this fn<t 
wn« purposely concealed from tbe surell s nnd 
thev dltl not kuow nUnit It, this would rden>e 
them u(H»n the guaranty; and, If the notes were 
simply s continuation of Ibelr supposed liability 
on Ibe original continct, then the defembmts 
•re not liable, wilens Uiey knew at the signing 
of the notes of the double n tolJon of Scott to 
the parties to tbe sheep contract. 
Itennett, l lnrkuess, How at & Hradley and 
ttllllniiiM, \ n n Colt & Sutherland, for np|n>! 
lauts. Hruwu & lleitdersou, for rcHpoiiileiils 
MINRH, J (after Mating the facts) This 
caw wnn twice ltefore tbe territorial court pri-
or io this II)»|M nl Tbe cases are r e t r i e d in 
ft
 t tali. 411, H.i I'ac ZM, and 12 I Unit. Lilt, 42 
I'ae 2(»2 Ii|ion cadi <M»«II»-IOII the reeonl dls 
IIOMH a somewhat dissimilar state of fat Is 
rite enne now presents a somewhat differ 
cut Kittle of fncts from those pit Hinted on 
the bud ap)H>nl, so far us appeals ftotn the 
opinion remlereil The first ipiCHtlon arises 
opon the charge of the court as g h e n and 
the refusal of the court to charge as re 
<|t«'*ted In some respects the testimony bear 
Nt upon the question Involved Is somewhat 
ludennite »nd uitMitlsfnc torj l l t e j n r j were 
'of Judges of Its weight nud coiiflUHhcucKS. 
»nd rmiiitl ngntiiMt the piaiutlfls 'there are 
•iiflhlud fntis ,n),| rlniin^liinien disc IOMMI in 
the rcsxird rrom uhMi tbe Jmv eon Id infer or 
"ml that lungk, I ablaii nnd Scott were pmt 
•*w for the pui|Mise of pun basing s i m p and 
Hut Jungk and I abliui knew al the time or 
**" ihirgi nlile wllb nollis* that St oil was a 
l*rlim
 n | t i | I , , , , , , , , , „ Iui | t M I | o r „( |, n „ | m 
'•^Icsl win, , | M M I ,„ t | „ . | ( l | , i r J M | R r„r the 
l«»wluise and sale of sheep to them, that Crop 
per. Reed and Rcolt were part it. i s In the put 
chnxe nnd sale of Hheep to lungk and Fab an, 
that Crupper nisi Ittssl kntw, or w«ie charge 
able with not he , (bat Siott wns a partner or 
Interested in tbe contract for tbe pun IIUM» of 
sheep wllb Jungk ami I nbinn. that dt fend 
ants Ibdhrook and I>iigglns were wboll) Igno-
rant of the double relation existing IMIUCVII 
Scolt and the two firms at the time the) plgiietl 
the gunnifiM cemtrac t and tbe uotea given la 
puiNUiince of It, nntl would not luue cxciuled 
tbe conti-nt t or Indorsed the notes bad tbe true 
stnte of fmts been made known to litem by 
either tirm, Hint the eoms>nlineut of these fnc la 
and circumstances immcdintclv nffet leti tho 
llabiill) of the s u n ties; thai Cropper ami Heetl 
ami lungk and Fabian fraudulently withheld 
from Ibe sureties Die true stnie of facts exist 
Ing Itelwem them and Scott when lite indorse-
ments we're made; that each of these firms 
knew that Scott was tin Ir partner In tbe trans 
ml Ions with (he other (Inn and thai Ibe sure 
He" were milking tbe IndorM mi nt in Ignorant e 
of tbe relation, that lungk and Fabian sent 
Scott, as their agent nnd n pnsi n inthc to oh 
tnln (lie slgn-ilines of llollnisik nud H u g g i n g 
to Ibe contro l that Scolt was their partner 
at tbe time, that Jungk ami Fabian knew, or 
were charge able with not lee, that Cropjier, 
Heed, and Scolt owned sheep together at Oasis, 
and hud litem tin re when Fablau was present, 
that Heed and Crop|>ci nnd .lungk nnd Fnblnu 
knowing the facts, induced the surelles to sign 
flic notes, nnd fraudulentl> w Unlit hi fiom them 
(be double rein Mo n of Scolt, ns iiffectlug their 
Intercut nud liability. 
If. In obtaining Hie signatures of these de-
fendants to tbe contract of suicKship or ns hi 
dotners of the Hole* mnde In c ontliiu illon of 
theli i<np|iose,| llabiill v. there was nm fi.iudu-
lent coiiceabueiit on the part of Crop|s r nud 
Hnsl and Jungk ami F.iblnu or either of said 
firms, of any fait or circumstance within their 
knowledge or eoncniiliig which tiny were ren 
somihry cbaigeablc> with itollcv whbh materl 
nlli niTccbsl nud lucieased the llihlllti and re 
siHiiiKlhllll) of llolbr<Mik nud Ihigglits as sun* 
l b s oi ludnrxcrs lu those Iraiisai tlmis In whhli 
they we ic Kiirc ties nm) oi* tateil to llielr preju 
dhe then the Niucllf« should be CIIM Imrgetl 
"It has been he Id that Ibe mere uoii<-<iiuuiiiul 
cation h\ thec iu l l lor to the sttitti of material 
f a i l s within tbe knowledge of tbe c nslltor 
whlib the miietj should kisiw nltltoiigli not 
willful or liitcutloual cm the p.ut of the < re.lit 
or, or wltb u vh w to adiautage to himself 
will discharge the surety " The ftaud upon 
the HUICHCK c-»»us|vt« in (be situation lu which 
tbey were placed by the eoudut t of tbe olliei 
putties ami not on what was pac ing lu their 
mii'cls not e\pic>«-Msl but concealed Upon 
this subject. Ilian.lt on Nutetislilp l.-et Hon 
l*_1M sa.is " | | I t . i s lHtubtld Hill 'one who he 
comes s u n t y for niiotber must ordltmrlh lie I comes s u n t y for niiotber must onllnnrlU lie 
ni ismmtl It.' tin MI instil Hit. IH lit f tlt.lt Hit; -
jransac licit bel wnoil J^IM^ IJIhie tj.nl p tHh-^ H ^ 
I cniecK t til rjii^ InTiie* ti*injf*oiiiiHo of Tiii^iie - i of 
I tli.it dest rljitlon, sub'ji c HinJ bint oiilj"7crilie or 
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llnnry rl»k* attending It; and the pnrty to 
to know jj'fltynt •• W,'L '"' J>'^  JL,,,,llJjrliLl|ilL,,'Lll 
andIliaTlio'w'llP'i'rn insaill'uiiltHH In* Is In 
f.'.iuied Mint Hint' are cxli'iipi'lliianr 
Milium lift-, ting the risk To H'"'Kc 
m\ kii'MWi to in- m lint; iifton the In lief that t ime 
no UIIUMIII i in must DM en lit whl.h his 
" • . . ' ; ; ~ ' "mim,,.mA i - • . « « . . . - • H .1 i I . . . . . . ftjr-ha "111 1M; iii<H',tl.ilh, It i- i ' inl , vr)1 fr'rl 
Hint there nre KIII lii i h"''"'|MtnlV <>*{ IUUI linv^ 
iig an o|»|M»ihiiilt^ (Q iiinl^i' Mii'iirtit'i^nViinT 
•withholding MH in inie-l IM- II KIIIil. I| n»j± hjp»l 
ffiiiiid In whl«it~tli< <-ui.lt ttlli lie ielh~\i>| 
TiThl* tmitnu «.' " It In n|R«» In Id that, lu or-
ihr to illMhnijre the auud) , Mie nudist lusts I In-
formation should relate to buslm SH width Is 
the sublet t of Hiire»3slil|i Hl<<n sa\a " I he 
colli I.xt of sin el v liiUMirln enll ie good fiillh 
ami coiiHdi nee bet wet u the pintles In icgnrd to 
the whole Irnnsiu ll.ui A m t nimuiim nt of 
timurUil fiHln. or am MiiriM or Implt. I mH 
' renrest'iilallop of Mien, fa i l s , nr aiij limine ml 
tin r In -onnrhe or IM withholding proper hi elMji, r n 
M"ial)v!ii, »IH wn,|,,"J±i!!iJ.,a.lil.?»." •»!.£ 
;l(iit ground to hnnlldnti' Hie tonliait . II|H.II 
the w ground. Hie ms l i lo i R" In aTTsuhst' 
quent IraiiMii Hons with (he ilehtor hound to 
eipial good fnllh to the surd) ' S inn l>| 
Jur f :{-! I Hunk \ Coo|ier HIM.- tTII.Hiiin.il. 
Bur. | | 4 ID 421; Comstot k v Onge, 01 III 
3*28; l lrnk v Stevens, 3» Me 5.52; Juugk 
T Heed. O Utah, 411, 33 I'ne 23d, I V t k v IHir 
rett, 0 I»nnn. 4stl, IMtlent k v lllslmp, 1 IJIW 
Mil Hi. Doughty • S innge 2K ( onu 1 Kt 
Italllon v Mallow*. II) ( link ft V 1> II War 
ren v Branch, 15 W \ n 2\ It IH said that 
that "text AM to whether Hie illselosuie HIIOIIIII 
I HI voluntarily uinde In whethtr thi ie IH n eon 
tract iMitiiiii the debtor and eiislltt.r to the 
elfeit Hint his |HJS|||UU Khali he a different one 
from Mint width the Ninety might ex|H>tl" 
Hamilton v Watson, 12 Clark A r . \m 
These sureties did not know that Seolt was 
A partner of each Hi in on the touti iul < on 
cernliiK which thej were sureties, and did not 
Indorse with Hie knowledge Hint tin \ w u e 
hemming llnl.le for the nets of Siolt In the 
iiinnlpiilatlou of the buslm s* of the s o c i a l 
firm* I h t y s lg ind as MIU'IICR for Cioppcr 
ami Heed, red ing upon their lutcgil l) , and 
not aa Mirclles for f i opptr , It* «*«1 and Scott 
When thev Rluned the) were not liitoiuusl 
that a member of Intth Iliiun had laid plans 
with each bv u h h h th<> HUH His should be 
robbetl. and <'i«>pper mil Itetd mined f»i Ha 
lieuellt of one member of the several Hi ins 
Nor did the M I I . I I I S know thai < toppi-i and 
Itrcd and .liiupk nnd I ablali w u e ellla r pas 
* l \ e or n e t h e acentM In Mi< It le^ulllng dl-
honeslr N . l l l u i did the sun Ih s know that 
JuiiRk and Fabian km n that Siolt was In 
teieNted with < loppt r and Ib'ed In the sale 
of sheep, nor Hint t'ropiN-r and lb ed knew 
that Kiolt was lul l< d with lungk and 
I ablnn In the puiihnse of sh« < p If a ma 
tertal fait < onu d with the i o n i u m of 
•ureljuhlp, uud dlitol ly affettlng the MUieHciT 
llablllly, w h h h ml({ht Influence the auretle« 
In enieihig into the contract, te coneeuleti 
fioiu the fturelle*, or, If knowing the fact 
SIK h lufoi iiiatlou In purposely eomealed fro-j, 
the RiiiftlcR, In the Interest of the creditor 
sin h (oui ialmeut, though no ini|iilry In rnade 
by the su ie lhs , amnunts to a frnud upon (Qt 
"sinfiles, ami would dlHchnrge them from | | a . 
J^llltj Under all the facts nnd clrctuuHlanrea 
"RIIOWII for the consideration of the Jury, Hn<* 
l a n e found the fin In ttgnlusl the appellimi,, 
>\ e llnd no re\erslble etror lu the Instmt Holu| 
of the lomt , nor IH theie any error In reft-.*, 
lug to give the Instructions asked by the 
plaintiffs 
Pi lor to (he trial plaintiff* moved Hie dla 
trh t court of Utah toiiiil) for an onler Iraim 
feu hit: Raid tausc for Hlal to Salt hake mm, 
I) 'the motion was bas«s| upon an ntlhhuit 
showing Hint pl.iliillffs owned the noles, and 
had resided In Salt Mil mix slni e l|Hy 
were g h e u , and that Hit > wi ic |»n\abli« at 
Salt Lake 'I he motion was oxeiruled, nut] 
on extepllou taken The motion Is based on 
set Hon T of nith le 21. and set Hon ,r» of artk|e 
8. of the tonstlliiHon rialuHITs resided In 
Salt Ijike (Ml) when lhe\ l o i u u u m e d thin 
at Hon In Hie 1 list dlstilt-t un l i t In (Mali 
touul ) , Jiniuaiy Id. I Mill '| Ida ta se hml 
I wen tried lu that count) three limes prior to 
the last lilal. whhh IMtuned (). tola i II |H!NI 
'J he tit feiidauta resided In I'IOXO, Utah conn 
ly Seel Ion H of a i l i i le H or the » OIIHIIIUIIOD 
provides, among olhei things, that all civil 
and t rimlnnl husliif-s mlsiug In an) enuuty 
must be tried lu sin h tount ) , unless a chance 
of >enue be taken. In suth . IIH'N aa may be 
pi in hied by law Set lion 7 of arthle 21 of 
Ihe loustlliitlon provide*, ninoug other thing* 
that all in lions and (aseH pending In the di* 
trht nnd Riipieine eouita of the teullory it 
Hie time Ihe slate is admitted Into the Union 
Hunll entvut a« ottwrwlse \icu\Uktl, l»e traiw 
feiied lo Ihe supreme court and district courts 
of the Rlate Se. lion 2 of arthle 21 of the 
toiisllliitlou prmlilcR that all laws of Ihe ter 
rltoi) now In foice, and not lepuguaul to the 
lonsllliitlou, shall remain In f u u e until tlior 
expire of their o » n lludlatlon, or ate aliens! 
or rep. alt d by the IcgM.ituie Se. Hon 5 of 
in Ih l e 8 o f the loiisllliilloii Is ouh pio-pei live 
lu lit* opeiallons, and Hniefoie does not a|s 
ply to m lions width we ic tommiuted nuJ 
|M nding lu the lenltoii . i l i lMi i . t IOIUIH wlien 
Ihe loii^lllutloii went Into efle<t. A tniifcll 
luHonal pio\K)oa should not be toiistiuetl 
Willi a lelioopMlite operation, unless that 1» 
Ihe uuiiiKtakahle liileulion of the woids u-<tsl 
lU.uk, (Vnisl Law, p 71), 1-nd lute ip St I 
mat: Watt v Wilghl »MI ( a l Joj. .I Pne 1», 
(Iiuiiee \ . Suptilm ( unit, r.H I al SS, Teopk! 
v Counl) l o i n is of (•land Co , U Colo lUd. 
M'hlgh lion Co v l^ower Mm uugle T p . 8* 
I'a St 4S4 Se. lion 2 of a i l l t le 21 of t»o 
lonsilliiHon toul lnuis In foue , under tl>« 
Rtale. MII h leii l loihil laws as wen- not re 
pugnaiil lo It, and Hi. i . b \ makes them stu'« 
laws. 'JIlls touit uo held lu Whipple v. UeO-
Otatt) WRIGHT ?. SOUTHERN PAO. CO. 809 
„ 4fi Tac 271. 13 Utah. 484; PlesRant 
t!uTc°«I C o - r- l l o " r d ot Coorra, 48 Vac. 
\Jr> 15 U'nh, 07. Among the laws of the 
liory then In forco with reference to the 
tare ot trial were BCCMOIIS 81U.1 to 3J(H. 
f inn I ' n w 8 U , a D 1 8 S S * * * h , c h W P r e o>HOU»l-
^ ( i „ 8 Lnws 1K00. p Ot)) by making these 
lion" e««''0» , n t ° , n o u e w comlltloii of 
'hliiS* « n , , , , r l , , e ctwiRlMullon The terrlto-
I | n t was RiiliHt.iuilallj- reet inelcd after 
(IrlklnC out Ihe words "Judhlal dls lrkl ." and 
lulHlinting Hie woitl "county " 'Ihe act wan 
p,„o»cd and look effect February 17, IKUtl, 
before this motion wan made. This act pro 
•WW where casca shall be commenced and 
tried s»d when and where Ihey may lie re-
voscA for tiiul Set Hon 3IIW pio\ ldes that 
In nil othei tases the action must la» tried 
lg t|,P louiity In which the defendants, or 
•otne of them, reside at the commenteineut 
of the action" When this action was coin 
nrnred, the plaintiffs resided In Salt Lake, 
tn<! the defendants In Utah, county. Tito 
first district formerly comprised Utah and 
tevernl other counties Under the new con 
dilution. Utah county Is made distinct by 11-
*|f The action was brought In pursuance 
«f Uw In the proper county under the statute 
$$ it then existed. This statute was conttn 
otd In folic until changed by the act of l^XL 
Hf ere of the opinion that the district court 
ef L'IRII county pioperly assumed Jiirladh Hon 
In HIIR itf-p We And no reversible eiror In 
lbs proceedings 1 he judgment of the dis-
trict tour t Is alllrmed, with costs 
7.ANB. O. J , concurs. HART, Diaurict 
Judge, concurs lu the result. 
(II tltMi I 'D 
URIHIIT ». SOUTHHRN TAG CO. 
tSnimme Court ol V5ti»h. June 24. 1807.) 
IirrnT IXTIMOIT—Rrvntw ON FOHMI a ArrRAL 
— INJI IIT TO b t^^  iorr—I %u>r-\t r 
1 NlirtlifT a WIIIKSII !• nhonn to he qunlifii.l 
j# If^ iiJv IIH to inn iters of opinion In n pi.lun-
•imi, IIUX.IHUI fur uif i n n jiiutre to pass upon 
tttlir mi l nnd Ins dim n Hon in rmithisive un-
**i in iiiif.-lly crronemiM as s niattt r of law, 
*'i4 tin riniiiing and n'Timi;eiii« ut of loromo-
l"M li *io fnr • part oiilsi.le of thr« cxpeiun. e 
•n.l knou I. IKP of or<linnr> jiin.rs as to render 
'»|Nrl tiMiiiiuiii) pro|M r and mlmi-MMc 
* " w nut iic<.«'«>uy or usiml for the stipn me 
"xat to puss upon cnth ami everv ipi. -ima |»'^ "<l on u|i|K d win n the cns«. nt reM rse.| It is 
J""1 t to puss ii|ion NIMI dileriiiine NIH li i|u. •-
"'""<inis.il mi HM nppiiil as nic ntttssnry to 
»* finnl il.driiiiiiHlii.il of the case 
»'lhe |M>|><iinli.iu of the p h t e wlure the ln-
JJI'l lia|i|Hii(.l (In |iro|H)iti«.ii of Hie population 
M wire iiiilr.uid impl.^e . ami ihe d IIIMT of 
I T . ' " 1 " ' ,»••,, "' , , r '""'"•,«,»',l> t. . i iu.it.d 
•Jih ||,(> innKiM>; „|, 0 f trabiN. were yuwliou* not 
•"••nut to lire int-c na piesented. 
WxllikuB |,y tlie lourLI 
*l'l>eal from district court, Weber county; II 
B
 H««lnp|i, Judge 
Anion |»y James Alficd Wright ngilnst Ihe 
"'""'•rtj I'atiile Company. Judgmtiit for 
••"•Ilff. Deftudant appeals. Ailliuiud. 
Marshall A, Ooyle. for apj^llaut nichanls 
& MainiUhm ami A. K Tratl. for rtM|Mindeut. 
MINHIt. J. This action was brought to re-
cover damages for persimnl Injuries sustained 
by the plniuliff through the alleged negligence 
of the defi ixlant In falling to furiiMi a tlre-
man In addition to the engineer to operate Its 
engine, and In the engineer negligent!/ falling 
to olit) the signals ghen , while acting In the 
double tap i. l u of engineer and fireman 'I ha 
retord shows that the plaintiff was a switch-
man In the emplo) of the defendant at the time 
of the accident On the morning of Ihe l l t b 
day of August. 1»»2. about 1 15 o'clock, lie 
was performing his duties as switchman, nnd. 
for the puipose of uncoupling them, went lo 
be lw.ea two tars of a freight Main. will, h was 
standing u|Min a slight grade, so that the links 
were drawn tUht. Ih lug unable to uncouple 
thi in on account of the gradi. he came out 
from between the cats and wlHi his lantern 
signaled I he engineer, who performed the du-
ties of llrvinaii as well as engineer, to back up 
slowly, and then stepped In ngiln between the 
cars to pull the pin the moment the Rlatk came, 
and stood with Ids back towards the engine 
and one hand ii|mii tbo rung of flic ladder on 
the csr In front of him '| |H> rnglnccr saw and 
ohc)cd the signal, but the train came back 
with a Jerk, and plaint Iff s right heel was 
caught and held by the brake beam He Im-
mediately gras|»ed the rung of the ladder with 
his other hand, and signaled the engineer wltb 
his lantern to stop, throwing bis lantern out to 
one ride. 1 his signal was not seen by the en-
gineer, who at this parlltular moment waa 
netessarlly cup igetl In shoveling coal lulo the 
flre,-a duty width should have been perform-
ed by a lliein.in -and the pi ilnllff waa dragged 
for some dlstam-e until his hands were Jerked 
fioni their hold ii|H.n the ladder, and he waa 
thrown \MM1VT the wheels of the caT, wWcn 
passed over Ids leg. necessitating Its amputa-
tion at a point about ue\en Indies above the 
knee 
On the trial of the case Mr Doughty waa 
called as a witness for the plilntlff. and" gave 
testimony tt nding to show that he was Ihe en-
glmer updating the engine at Hie lime of the 
nitldent. and had Item so emp|o\cd for about 
one year, that he had l>ccn In the employ of 
the deft iitlnut eouiptuy s lme 1HST>. that be 
was car Impet tor for the d. fcmlaiit the lli«t 
year at C.irlin. bad worked ns helper in the 
mntlilue shops for set iral mouths; work).I as 
t inman on the roul for three ye irs again as 
i cp iher for s e i er i l years at different points 
on Hie road; Hut It was his duly as hel|ier to 
take tare of the engines and fix them up. and 
in. pare them to go out. since July, 1S!l|, had 
(harge of the swlbh engine, and run It at 
nU'ht; t int his duty was to run the engine 
as cnghncr, and do Hie tiring when needed. 
No Hitman was furnished on the engine at the 
time of the a c i d , nt 'I hereupon the plilnllfl 
aMwd the witness the following question: 
"Sow, Mr Doufchly, 1 want to aak you. In your 
